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7 August 1985

USSR REPORT

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY
No 5, MAY 1985

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LESSONS OF WAR AND ORIGINS OF U.S. NUCLEAR STRATEGY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 85 (signed to press 16 Apr 85) pp 36-46

[Article by Lt Gen M. A. Mil'shteyn, retired veteran of the Great Patriotic War]

[Text] When they observe the great date of the 40th anniversary of the victory over Fascist Germany in these days, the peoples of the world cannot but reflect upon the fact that mankind has already lived under the constant threat of a nuclear catastrophe for many years now. The explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki literally sounded the ominous alarm and announced the beginning of the nuclear age.

What are the origins of U.S. nuclear policy and how has this policy developed, in what precise way have the lessons of the war affected its formation and what were the specific characteristics of early American plans for the use of nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union? Correct answers to these questions are of lasting interest not only for a comprehensive appraisal of U.S. nuclear strategy, but also for a comprehensive appraisal of current trends in its development.

The American military mind immediately after World War II was held captive by the conclusions that were primarily based on operations of the U.S. bomber air force and the results of the atomic bombing of the defenseless Japanese cities of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, where a total of about 500,000 people died. Figuratively speaking, this was a one-directional, or one-sided, perception of the lessons of World War II.

American military thought in that period assigned primary importance to the fact that it was precisely the United States that had mastered the nuclear weapon and had demonstrated all the force of the annihilating and destructive implications of its use to the entire world, and especially to the USSR. It is, therefore, no accident that all of the other experiences of the participation of the American armed forces in World War II, including the large-scale amphibious and landing operations, the struggle for air and sea domination and the operations of ground forces and of the Navy and tactical aviation, were relegated to the background, and leading U.S. strategists and military theorists were mainly engaged in developing plans for, and concepts of, using the new super-powerful weapon and bomber carriers for its delivery, all for the

purpose of carrying out the expansionist global policy of the United States, which was aimed mainly against the Soviet Union. From the very first day of their appearance in the U.S. arsenal, nuclear weapons became, so to speak, the cornerstone and main supporting base of U.S. foreign policy.

It was universally acknowledged that nuclear weapons had caused a revolution in military affairs and had radically changed the nature and methods of future warfare: For the first time in history, wars in the future would not be fought by the United States for the exhaustion of the enemy, as during World War II, but for the annihilation and destruction of the enemy.

Senator McMahon, who headed the joint congressional committee on atomic energy during those years, went so far as to call the atomic bombing of Hiroshima "the greatest event in world history since the birth of Jesus Christ."¹ Some American military experts and theorists even believed that the absolute weapon had finally been developed, and that the United States would have a monopoly on it.² The future importance of strategic aviation was also announced at every opportunity.

Extensive discussions developed in the United States immediately after the war about the role of the systematic bombing of Germany and Japan by the U.S. Air Force in achieving the victory. The multi-volume review of these operations compiled by several American scientists and officials exaggerated this role contrary to facts and the truth, and attributed an almost decisive importance to the bombing raids.³

"Even if," this survey said, "the final military victories which brought the Allied armies to the Rhine and the Oder had not taken place, Germany's military production would have been completely paralyzed by May as a result of the bombing raids. The German armed forces would have been completely unable to acquire ammunition or fuel and would probably have stopped resisting."⁴ In reference to Japan, the survey stated: "The air raids were so devastating that Japan would have had to surrender within a few months, even if the atom bombs had not been dropped."⁵ Other authors noted that the atom bombs had been delivered by airplanes and that the results of the bombings should also be listed among the achievements of bomber aviation. General Arnold, who commanded the U.S. Air Force during the war, had this to say about the role of the atomic weapon: "The influence of the atomic bomb can be described quite simply: It turned the Air Force into the most important branch of the armed forces."⁶

It was for all of these reasons that strategic aviation was regarded as the main branch of the armed forces in the United States at that time, the branch representing the country's main military strength. In addition, it is true that the strategic bombers were then (and until 1960) the only means of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets.

In view of the importance attached to the bomber air force, the independent Strategic Air Command (SAC) was formed as part of the U.S. Armed Forces in March 1946. It had the function of selecting targets and of planning the use of nuclear weapons against them. It is true that supplies of nuclear munitions and the range of U.S. strategic aviation were quite limited at that time,

and this naturally had a restraining effect on the arrogant, sinister and far-reaching plans and intrigues of the American command.

Due to the shortage of fissionable materials, the augmentation of the U.S. nuclear arsenal was an extremely slow process during the first 5 years. The United States had 2 bombs in 1945, 9 in 1946, 13 in 1947 and 50 in 1948. Then their numbers began increasing more quickly. There were already 250 in 1949, 450 in 1950 and 650 in 1951. In other words, in 6 years the number of nuclear weapons rose from 2 to 650, or 325-fold. Later the augmentation process was even quicker.⁷

As for carriers, bombers, as mentioned above, were the only means of delivery at that time. In World War II American aviation conducted the strategic bombing of Fascist Germany primarily with B-17 and B-24 planes with subsonic speeds, a range of around 1,500 kilometers and a payload of several tons. The bombing of Japan was conducted from distant bases, requiring planes with a longer flight range. The plane used for this purpose was the B-29 "superfortress," with a range of 2,400 kilometers. These planes dropped atom bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. For this reason, when the SAC was created in March 1946, it was equipped only with 148 B-29 planes. Within 2 years, or by 1948, two new types of bombers were being used, the B-36 and the B-50, and the total number rose to over 500. In 1955 the B-52 bomber began to be used, and the total number of SAC planes reached 1,500.⁸

In the first years after the war the dominant American military-strategic concept was "nuclear deterrence" ["ustrasheniye"], based on the so-called "Truman Doctrine." The doctrine was expounded for the first time by President H. Truman in his address before a joint session of the Congress on 12 March 1947.⁹ Briefly, the essence of the doctrine was to ensure for the United States--on the pretext of providing assistance--the possibility of interfering in the internal affairs of a number of European countries and turning their territory into a U.S. military-strategic bridgehead for the implementation of the policy of "containing" ["sdershivaniye"] and "rolling back" communism.

It is indicative that some American researchers find a certain continuity between the Reagan Administration's policy line and the policy of which Truman is considered godfather.¹⁰

The strategic air force and the nuclear weapons delivered by it were regarded as the main means of implementing the concept of "deterrence."

In one American study, U.S. military strategists had this to say about this concept: "By official American groups, the concept of 'deterrence' was regarded as an essentially simple one: It was the exclusive function of the Strategic Air Command, and the atom bomb with which the SAC was armed and the creation of the SAC itself were a direct result of the United States' atomic monopoly."¹¹ It was also stressed that the constant threat of the atomic bombing of Soviet cities and industrial regions was so real and could be so effective that there would no longer be any need for large American armed forces. It is not surprising that the SAC received the lion's share of the military budget (at least one-sixth of all military appropriations),¹² and this was one of the reasons for the sharp cuts in U.S. armed forces personnel immediately after World War II.

In those years General Arnold wrote about the possible composition of the U.S. Armed Forces in the future in connection with the appearance of nuclear weapons: "It is quite possible that the further development of the Air Force, particularly in connection with atomic weapons, guided missiles and other improved technology, will eliminate the need for a large Army and Navy. These forces should be more mobile and should be dispersed for the avoidance of enemy air attacks."¹³

It must be said that not all Americans agreed with these extreme opinions. They were most vehemently opposed by representatives of other branches of the armed forces, each of whom argued that his branch required as much development as strategic aviation.

In 1948 General LeMay was appointed commander of the SAC.¹⁴ As the founder of the development of detailed plans for a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union, which were subsequently designated as the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), he left a distinctive and noticeable mark on American nuclear strategy. He was known as an uncompromising and unyielding supporter of the theory of Italian General Douhet and his American follower, General Mitchell, who advised a preventive nuclear strike against the enemy.

During the war LeMay headed the 21st Bomber Command, which operated against Japan from American bases in the Pacific. There he acted on his views by conducting the brutal, admittedly terroristic and foul bombing of Japanese cities for the purpose of the total destruction of buildings and the mass annihilation of people. On 9 March 1945, for example, he ordered a raid on Tokyo by 334 B-29 planes carrying around 2,000 tons of bombs, many of which were incendiary. This raid killed almost 84,000 people, wounded over 40,000, destroyed around 270,000 buildings, or around one-fourth of all urban buildings, and left over a million people homeless. Similar raids were conducted against Osaka, Kobe, Nagoya and other Japanese cities on his orders.¹⁵ According to American reports, these raids killed 330,000 civilians and destroyed 8.5 million buildings.¹⁶

Is it at all necessary to say here that LeMay was enthusiastic about the appearance of nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal and did not hesitate to use them against Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Finally, he thought, the Air Force had a weapon with which it could defeat any enemy. He did not give much thought to the consequences of the use of that weapon; he had little interest in any of the physical implications of its use. After all, no one but the United States had the weapon, and therefore no one could threaten the United States. He also had no doubts about the target of this weapon, and the concept of a first preventive strike did not bother him either. He was ready to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union at any time.

As the head of the SAC, LeMay saw himself as the master of the strategic nuclear weapon and its carriers. It is indicative that he tried to keep the details of his plans a secret from everyone.

Here are some of his ideas. Once when he was asked how his plans for a preventive strike fit in with U.S. national policy goals, he replied: "I am certain that the United States will deliver the first strike without

hesitation if it has to do so." At another time, when someone from the Navy asked him what the SAC would do if nuclear weapons should be outlawed, he replied: "You sailors always ask stupid questions. It is clear to me that this will never happen."¹⁷ When they told him that the emphasis on a preventive strike was contrary to U.S. national policy, he replied: "That does not matter to me. It is my policy and I will carry it out."¹⁸ It is no coincidence that the authors of a well-known U.S. study of secret American plans for preparations for nuclear war concluded: "In fact, LeMay has never even considered the development of nuclear forces for a retaliatory strike; he has always concerned himself with building first-strike forces."¹⁹

In those years, General LeMay was not alone in his adherence to the idea of a preventive nuclear strike against the USSR. He was supported by some quite influential groups. For example, when Chairman V. Jordan of the National Industrial Council addressed an important gathering of the most prominent American businessmen (500 of them)--that is, influential members of the military-industrial complex, he declared that the United States should take advantage of its nuclear monopoly by issuing an ultimatum to the Soviet Union, demanding its complete disarmament and its submission to American dictat and control. He proposed that the rejection of the ultimatum be punished by a devastating preventive nuclear strike against the USSR. In 1949, G. Elliot published a book in which he argued, expressing the views of the abovementioned groups, the need for this kind of strike prior to the creation of a Soviet nuclear arsenal. "The only way," he wrote, "of completely or partially eliminating this possibility would consist in a rapid and massive strike to destroy centers in the Soviet Union."²⁰

The same "ideas" were the subject of serious discussion in official circles and found support there. These supporters became particularly numerous immediately after the first test of a Soviet nuclear device. Secretary of the Navy F. Matthews advocated a preventive war against the USSR and called this kind of war an "aggression for peace."²¹ Obviously, it would be wrong to believe that no Americans objected to these wild ideas. For example, General O. Bradley, who then commanded the Army, opposed the idea of a preventive strike. He believed that nuclear bombs alone could not guarantee a victory: They would require Army support. Even many Air Force officials were against the idea of the atomic blitzkrieg. President H. Truman did not support the idea at that time either, and he fired Secretary of the Navy Matthews for his excessively frank statements about the expediency of a preventive strike against the USSR.

During these "analytical" debates, concrete plans for nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union continued to be compiled. The first list of targets on Soviet territory was completed as early as summer 1947. It was later augmented, nuclear weapons were accumulated, the number of carriers increased and plans were perfected.

It would be possible to dwell less on the person of General LeMay if his "heritage" had not had such a serious impact on the entire postwar development of American military-strategic concepts and if his testimony had not demonstrated how far removed the official declarations of leading U.S. figures were from actual military plans and developments. At the same time

as it was repeatedly stated at official levels that the United States would never use nuclear weapons for "aggressive goals" and that these weapons were intended only for the protection of "Western democracy" against the "Soviet threat," quite different plans were being developed in the quiet of military offices.

Although the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 stipulated that only the President of the United States had the right to order the use of atomic weapons, the commander of the SAC was then the chief engineer of plans for their use. "And whereas in those days of the American atomic monopoly," the abovementioned study says, "President Truman could have taken the initiative in 'pushing the button' on the pretext that the Soviet Union was threatening the future of the free world, it was precisely LeMay who would have decided what should be done with the nuclear forces, how the war should be fought and, what is more important, how the war should be won."²²

During the first few years of his presidency, Truman was isolated from matters of nuclear strategy. He was not even informed of the exact number of nuclear weapons. Prior to 1948, there were no official presidential directives regarding the conditions and objectives of their use, although the first list of targets for a nuclear attack, as mentioned above, had already been drawn up in summer 1947.²³ It was not until September 1948 that Truman signed National Security Council Directive 30 and approved Directive 20/4, which provided a general outline of the objectives of the use of nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union. These were "the limitation or elimination of Soviet, or 'Bolshevik,' control in the Soviet Union and beyond its borders." In other words, the goal was to liquidate the Soviet Union and other socialist states.²⁴

Prominent American military and political figures understood that nuclear weapons and strategic aviation were not enough to achieve this goal. Military bases on foreign territory would also be necessary. The origins of the strategy of military bases--that is, of the formation of a global network of military and air bases around the Soviet Union to ensure a constant presence of large groups of the U.S. Armed Forces and Air Force in the overseas theaters of military operations for the purpose of implementing a global expansionist policy and exercising direct influence on the governments of states in which these forces would be stationed, and for the purpose of keeping these states in line with American policy--date back to that time. The policy of setting up military-political blocs served the same purpose. Within a relatively short period of time, between 1947 and 1951, the United States entered into formal alliances with 41 states,²⁵ including NATO in 1949 and ANZUS in 1951.

The North Atlantic alliance was the main military bloc organized at the suggestion of the United States. Its creation can be viewed as the logical conclusion of a series of U.S. measures to establish American control over the economies and policies of West European states and to use their territory and their human and economic resources against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The treaty on the North Atlantic bloc was based on false assumptions and myths about the need to protect Western Europe against the "danger of communism," "attacks from the East" and the "Soviet threat." These postulates were to serve not only as justification for American

expansionist plans and intentions, but also as the cohesive factor constantly urging members to maintain their combat readiness and intensify their military preparations. Military blocs organized in other parts of the world were based on similar myths and assumptions.

The emergency war plan of 1951 provides an example of how the United States intended to use air bases on foreign territory for a nuclear attack on the USSR. This plan stipulated that heavy bombers would take off from airfields in the state of Maine, drop 20 bombs on the Moscow-Gorkiy region and return to bases in Great Britain. Medium bombers from Labrador would simultaneously drop 12 bombs on Leningrad and return to bases in the British Isles. Medium bombers from here would deliver 52 bombs to the industrial regions of the Volga-Donetsk basin and return to Libyan and Egyptian airfields. Other medium bombers from the Azores would drop 15 bombs on the Caucasus and return to airfields in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. At the same time, medium bombers from Guam would drop 15 bombs on Vladivostok and Irkutsk.²⁶

Judging by this plan, the United States not only had bases for its aircraft on foreign territory but also stored nuclear weapons on these bases.

During the years of the nuclear age and of the U.S. nuclear monopoly, was the United States afraid that the Soviet Union might be able to produce its own nuclear weapon soon? Many predictions were made on the other side of the ocean, and they were all "gratifying" for the United States. In his book "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy," H. Kissinger wrote: "In 1945 we insisted that it would be at least 5 years before the Soviet Union had an atomic bomb, and this assumption stayed intact for the next few years."²⁷ According to the calculations of prominent war correspondent H. Baldwin, the USSR could build its first atom bomb sometime between 1950 and 1957, after which it would need another 20 years to accumulate large stocks of atomic weapons.²⁸ General Groves, who had headed the project for the development of the American atomic bomb (the "Manhattan Project"), reported to President Truman, who highly valued Groves' opinion, that the Soviet Union would need at least 20 years to build its first atomic bomb.²⁹

With a view to the "optimistic" forecasts, U.S. ruling circles intended to pursue "nuclear diplomacy" with impunity for a long time--that is, to follow a foreign policy course based on the threat to use nuclear weapons, counting on the United States' "strategic invulnerability" and being guided by the concept of "nuclear deterrence." The Soviet Union's first nuclear explosion in August 1949 came as an unpleasant surprise for many people in the United States. The test of the Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile in August 1957 and the launching of the earth's first artificial satellite on 4 October 1957 were even more unpleasant surprises for them.

The USSR's great scientific achievements overturned all of the calculations on which the American military plans and concepts were based. It became obvious that the territory of the United States was as vulnerable as the territory of any other country. New theories and new concepts then appeared in the United States.

But the loss of nuclear monopoly still did not involve the loss of nuclear superiority. And from that time onward, the United States set the preservation

of this supremacy by all possible means as the main goal of its military policy. The furious arms race that has brought the world to the present dangerous limit was initiated by the United States at that time.

On 9 June 1946 the Soviet Union submitted a draft convention unconditionally banning nuclear weapons to the UN Atomic Energy Commission. It proposed to ban the use of nuclear weapons, end the manufacture of these weapons and of the materials for their manufacture and destroy within 3 months all stocks of these weapons. However, that proposal was not adopted. Following its first nuclear test, the Soviet Union issued a statement in 1949 in which it clearly pointed out its intention to continue advocating an unconditional ban on nuclear weapons.

However, all these initiatives received no response and the United States, taking the bit between its teeth, began to build up its nuclear potential at an accelerated pace. It tried to solve the tasks of maintaining nuclear superiority both by quantitatively increasing and by qualitatively perfecting its nuclear arsenal.

In the beginning this was primarily a quantitative buildup. Here are the figures:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of nuclear warheads</u>
1949	250
1950	450
1951	650
1952	1,000
1953	1,350
1954	1,750
1955	2,250
1956	3,550
1957	5,450
1958	7,100
1959	12,000
1960	18,500
1961	23,000

"Nuclear Weapons Databook," vol 1, p 15.

In 1964 the U.S. nuclear arsenal already included 31,000 warheads. A further increase in their quantity became meaningless, and qualitative improvement became the main consideration. Ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads and, subsequently, with independently targeted warheads (the MIRV system) were built and were followed by mini-nuclear weapons and cruise missiles; their accuracy was greatly enhanced. The TNT equivalent of nuclear ammunition increased from a few tens of thousands of kilotons to several hundred thousand and even millions of kilotons. In the development of all of these systems, U.S. ruling circles were constantly guided by the aspiration to achieve at least a qualitative, if not also quantitative, superiority over the Soviet Union.

As events developed, however, the United States first lost the nuclear monopoly and then also lost its nuclear superiority. The USSR confidently moved toward a strategic equality with the United States and finally achieved it. Toward the end of the 1960's and at the beginning of the 1970's, Washington officially acknowledged the military-strategic parity between the United States and the USSR. "In the last 30 years," Chairman D. Jones of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, "the United States has traversed the road from an exclusive monopoly on nuclear weapons through nuclear superiority to a situation of approximate equality with the Soviet Union."³⁰

The acknowledgement of the military-strategic equilibrium did not come about at once, but resulted from long research and appraisals and had a far-reaching impact on all spheres of U.S. foreign policy and military activity. In the political sphere it signified that military strength and, first and foremost, its main element--that is, nuclear weapons--could no longer be regarded--as they had been until then--as almost the only means of attaining foreign policy goals. In the military sphere this equilibrium indicated that the use of nuclear weapons was fraught with an enormous potential danger for the United States itself and that general nuclear war would inevitably have a devastating impact on it. This also implied that many of the calculations on which earlier military-strategic concepts had been based turned out to be illusory. In this connection, it was necessary to seek a new and more realistic military-strategic concept. At the same time, certain influential U.S. circles have clearly acted contrary to reality by stubbornly ignoring the existence of parity or equality with the USSR in strategic forces. They have sought and continue to seek roundabout and even direct ways of achieving military advantages not only by creating new weapons and improving the qualitative characteristics of existing ones, but also by means of new military-strategic concepts.

The entire experience in the development of Soviet-American relations has cogently demonstrated that, during the entire period since the American leadership's acknowledgement of the existence of parity with the Soviet Union in strategic forces, some influential groups in Washington, representing mainly the interests of militarist groups and the military-industrial complex, have tried to escape the situation of equality. They have counted on regaining military superiority over the USSR. This search has grown particularly intense since the start of the Reagan Administration.

Contradictory tendencies of this kind have been reflected in the past and are reflected now in the content and aims of military-strategic concepts. Moreover, these tendencies are one of the characteristic features of these concepts. The use of nuclear weapons for political goals is the main problem toward the solution of which the military-strategic concepts are constantly directed. In other words, it is a question of how to ensure the use of the enormous arsenal of nuclear weapons--at different stages and under different conditions--as a means of solving international problems to the advantage of the United States without subjecting the United States to the risk of suffering "unacceptable losses"; of what the nuclear strategy should be; of what strategic forces the United States should have that would best serve the goal of carrying out that strategy; of what demands should be made on the Soviet Union; and of what targets should be hit first.

The concepts of "assured destruction," "limited losses," "limited nuclear war," "measured use of nuclear weapons," "counterforce," "retargeting" and others gradually made their appearance. In contrast to the simple strategies of "nuclear deterrence" of the late 1940's and of "massive retaliation" in the 1950's, the 1961 strategy of "flexible response" presupposed the "measured" use of military force in proportion to the scale of military danger; the strategy of "realistic deterrence" appeared in 1971, the strategy of "active counteraction" appeared in 1977, the strategy of "direct confrontation" appeared in 1981, etc.

The immutable and most distinctive features of all these military-strategic concepts are their aggressive character and their anti-Soviet aims.

The study of some aspects of the origins of American military-strategic concepts of nuclear warfare as outlined in this article would be of merely historical interest if it were not for the fact that this kind of study makes it possible to define and understand the primary premises of American nuclear strategy, the factors forming the basis of that strategy at the very dawn of the nuclear age, the calculations (and miscalculations) characteristic of American military thinking, the specific characteristics of real plans for the use of nuclear weapons, the discrepancy between these plans and official statements, etc. Briefly, the study of that remote period of 40 years ago is also of indisputable value in the appraisal of current military-strategic concepts.

In particular, with regard to the original premises that were adopted by the American leadership in the elaboration of American military-strategic concepts of nuclear warfare as far back as at the time of the first appearance of these concepts, it can be said that many of them have undoubtedly retained their significance to this day. Here are some of them:

1. The Soviet Union is the main force in the world preventing the United States from pursuing its policy from a position of strength with impunity by opposing the American expansionist policy; consequently, it is regarded as the chief adversary and the only force in the world capable of directly threatening the territory and the very existence of the United States;
2. Military strength and, first and foremost, nuclear weapons represent the main means of attaining foreign policy goals;
3. The possession of bases on foreign territory is the most important condition for the implementation of the American command's plans and intentions;
4. Western Europe represents the forward line of U.S. defense and the forward bridgehead for active military operations by American military forces against the USSR and other countries of the socialist community;
5. The United States must constantly strive for military superiority, especially in the decisive spheres of military strength. If this superiority cannot always be achieved in quantitative aspects, the qualitative superiority of the United States must be maintained constantly and unconditionally;

6. The United States should be constantly prepared to fight a nuclear war and to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and its strategic nuclear forces must therefore be maintained in a state of constant combat readiness. In other words, military-strategic concepts must provide for the possibility of carrying out a preventive nuclear strike against the USSR;

7. The existence of superior potential for the conduct of a nuclear war and the readiness to fight such a war and achieve a victory in it acceptable to the United States represent the best form of counteraction against the Soviet Union;

8. The main and primary purpose of the use of nuclear weapons must be to deprive the opponent of the possibility (or reduce this possibility) of carrying out an effective retaliatory strike, and the subsequent goal must be "assured destruction"--that is, to inflict unacceptable losses on the Soviet Union and to remove it from the ranks of world powers;

9. As long as nuclear war represents a mortal danger for the United States, Washington must regard the prevention of nuclear war as an important goal of U.S. foreign and military policy;

10. All measures in the military sphere must have the external appearance of reactions to imaginary aggressive actions or aggressive plans of the Soviet Union (the permanently operating military-political concept of the "Soviet military threat") and must be portrayed exclusively as defensive actions that serve only to strengthen the United States' own national security;

11. Concrete plans for nuclear strikes and official (declared) military-strategic concepts are drawn up simultaneously, and generally display essential and fundamental discrepancies. Official (declared) concepts are used to cover up the real plans of the military command.

These are the most important premises on which the U.S. leadership has based the elaboration of its military-strategic concepts, and they were laid down as far back as in the first postwar years. The list could naturally be extended. Here we have listed only the most important--that is, the basic premises that, as mentioned above, are still being used in one form or another as the initial premises of U.S. military strategy, regardless of the party affiliations of Washington administrations.

In the past 40 years, U.S. nuclear strategy has traversed a complicated, contradictory and dangerous path marked by miscalculations and vain hopes. The names of strategic goals and military-strategic concepts have changed, but one thing has stayed immutable: a constantly striving for military superiority over the Soviet Union and the tendency to rely on the use of nuclear weapons for the pursuit of policy from a position of strength. This has been achieved by the quantitative buildup of nuclear weapons in some cases, by their qualitative improvement in others and by both simultaneously in still others. Attempts have now been launched to transfer the arms race to outer space. All of this, however, has failed to bring any success to the United States in the past and will undoubtedly bring it no success in the future.

The strengthening of security, including U.S. security, and the elimination of the threat of nuclear war cannot be achieved by means of an arms race, but by the reduction and the eventual total and universal elimination of nuclear weapons.

FOOTNOTES

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6. "The War Reports of General of the Army G. Marshall, Chief of Staff, General of the Army H. Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Fleet Admiral E. King, Chief of Naval Operations," N.Y., 1947, p 462 (hereafter called "The War Reports").
7. "Nuclear Weapons Databook, vol 1, U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities," Cambridge (Mass.), 1984, pp 6, 15.
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11. "American Defense Policy," edited by J. Reichard and S. Sturm, 5th ed, Baltimore-London, 1982, p 106.
12. Ibid.
13. "The War Reports," p 453.
14. In 1961 he was appointed commander of the U.S. Air Force, in 1965 he retired, but in 1968 he made an unsuccessful bid for the U.S. vice presidency.
15. R. Weigley, Op. cit., p 365; F. Kaplan, "The Wizards of Armageddon," N.Y., 1983, p 42.

16. K. Greenfield, Op. cit., p 119.
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20. G. Elliot, "If Russia Strikes," Indianapolis, 1949, p 397.
21. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 1984, pp 168-169.
22. P. Pringle and W. Arkin, Op. cit., p 45.
23. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Spring 1983, pp 11-12.
24. Ibid., p 14.
25. J. Record, "Revising U.S. Military Strategy," N.Y., 1984, p 13.
26. P. Pringle and W. Arkin, Op. cit., pp 59-60.
27. H. Kissinger, "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy," N.Y., 1957, p 32.
28. Ibid.
29. P. Pringle and W. Arkin, Op. cit., p 53.
30. "Statement of General D. Jones. Presentation to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate," February 1978, p 8.

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TECHNICAL, ORGANIZATIONAL SHIFTS IN U.S. ECONOMY

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[Article by V. M. Kudrov and Yu. I. Bobrakov: "Lenin's Theory of Imperialism and Contemporary American Capitalism"]

[Text] Marxists have never regarded their economic theory as a set of absolute truths and premises, eternal under any historical, national or other conditions. Marx himself regarded it primarily as a guide to action and had a hostile view of the attempts made in his lifetime to canonize Marxism. V. I. Lenin quite clearly declared: "We certainly do not view Marx' theory as something final and inviolable; we are certain, on the contrary, that it has laid only the cornerstone of the science socialists must advance in all directions if they want to keep up with actual events."¹

V. I. Lenin's famous work, "Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism," which was published half a century after the publication of the first volume of "Das Kapital," became a continuation and creative amplification of Marx' statements about the capitalist structure. The importance of Lenin's work to researchers of contemporary imperialism has not diminished; it has increased because it provides an example of a truly creative approach to the analytical generalization of a great variety of new processes and events. As long as imperialism exists, this work will be the most important tool for its study, and Lenin's methodology will arm progressive social theorists and revolutionary forces.

Some Distinctive Features of Contemporary Imperialism

It has been almost 70 years since the birth of Lenin's theory of imperialism. During this time imperialism has undergone a number of significant changes in the sphere of productive forces and production relations and in its superstructure. Soviet political economists have argued over their interpretations of the postwar period in the development of imperialism. Some economists have noted qualitative features distinguishing this period from the pre-war period of imperialism and have called it a new phase of imperialism. "We are deeply convinced," renowned Soviet economists S. I. Tyul'panov and V. L. Sheynis wrote, "that the development of capitalism underwent an important qualitative advance in the postwar period, affecting productive forces,

production relations, the social structure and the political and ideological institutions of bourgeois society. All of this fully justifies the discussions about a new phase in the history of imperialism."²

The most significant changes in the system of capitalist production relations include, above all, the further collectivization of production, partially under the influence of the establishment of an indissoluble connection between science and production and of state economic regulation, the development of integration processes and forms of capitalist ownership (joint stock societies and companies, cooperatives, various types of contract relations and others), the improvement of production control and new developments in distributive relations (social benefits) and so forth.

Only a few of these developments will be discussed in this article and will be illustrated with American examples.

The most important new features of the development of imperialism today are, in our opinion, the following:

The progressive contraction of its sphere of supremacy and the decline of its influence in the world;

The technological revolution, which entered a new stage in the second half of the 1970's;

The transformation of the system of state-monopolist regulation;

The appearance of new forms in the development and intensification of the socioeconomic contradictions of capitalism.

The non-socialist part of the world now contains 74 percent of the territory and 67 percent of the population of the world. These figures are much lower than they were after World War I (84 percent and 92 percent respectively in 1919).³ The world capitalist economy now produces around 70 percent of the income and 60 percent of the manufactured goods in the world.⁴ Capitalism today is opposed by the powerful socialist part of the world, which is constantly strengthening its position.

Over 2 billion people, or around half of the world's population, now live in imperialism's former colonies and semicolonies. This group of countries was once the politically dependent colonial periphery of imperialism. Now that these countries have embarked on the road of independent political development, they are fighting a successful struggle for economic independence, they are more likely to repulse imperialism and they are taking an independent position on the fundamental issues of the present day.

Imperialism's influence has thereby been considerably diminished in today's world and it has had to give up many of its positions.

The balance of power among the three centers of imperialism--the United States, Western Europe and Japan--has changed. The 1950's and 1960's were

distinguished by the perceptible reinforcement of U.S. positions, but they grew relatively weak in the 1970's, and this was specifically reflected in the declining competitive ability of many American goods on world markets, the reduction, and even the disappearance in some cases, of the economic and technological gap between the United States and the West European countries and Japan, the higher percentage of imported goods and foreign capital in the domestic U.S. market and the appearance of a chronic trade deficit.

Signs of crisis in the American economy and its instability have grown more pronounced. In just the last decade the levels of retail prices and unemployment doubled in the United States, rates of economic growth were cut by half and the public standard of living fell. The growth rate of labor productivity, representing the most important factor of production efficiency and competitive potential and a counterbalance to inflation, began to decline, slowly in the mid-1960's and more quickly after 1973. At the end of the 1970's there was even an absolute decrease. During this decade the country experienced three crisis-related production slumps, corporate profits decreased, the country's energy supply became less reliable and more costly than ever before, and the conditions of reproduction changed radically. To stimulate demand, traditional Keynesian regulation increased the percentage of government spending in the GNP, promoting higher taxes, larger trade and budget deficits and a larger amount of money in circulation, which intensified inflationary processes. Inflation became the main economic problem in the United States in the 1970's. In combination with the declining rates of economic growth, it gave rise to a new phenomenon in U.S. economic life--stagflation.

American capital, accustomed to occupying its position of leadership and regarding itself as the citadel and stronghold of international capital, suffered some discomfort and alarm and began to demand more freedom from the government, more resolute support for its activities and the cancellation of what it regarded as excessive regulating intervention in private business and social concessions. It successfully mobilized public opinion for a struggle to restore lost influence in the world, specifically by means of "reindustrialization" and the acceleration of scientific and technical progress. The United States' position in the capitalist world now appears to be strong again. Furthermore, the United States has launched a fierce economic attack on its allies.

Problems of Scientific and Technical Progress

Scientific and technical potential and the socioeconomic implications of scientific and technical progress are important features of contemporary American imperialism. V. I. Lenin is known to have noted two conflicting tendencies in the sphere of scientific and technical progress. One tendency (toward deceleration) is connected with the monopoly, its inherent stagnation and decay and its efforts to stop the spread of technical innovations. Another tendency (toward acceleration) is connected with the objective requirements of the laws of expanded reproduction, rising demand and the development of productive forces. "Various countries display first one and then the other of these tendencies in differing degrees during the

imperialist era. In general, capitalism is growing much more quickly than before," V. I. Lenin wrote.⁵

Furthermore, V. I. Lenin believed that the consideration of scientific and technical progress was an organic part of qualified economic thinking in general. "The economist," he wrote, "must always look ahead, toward technical progress, or he will quickly be left behind, because the person who does not look ahead is turning his back on history: There is not, and there cannot be, any intermediate course here."⁶ From this standpoint, the United States is an extremely interesting research topic.

Today the United States accounts for around half of the scientific and technical potential of the entire capitalist world. In 1984 American R & D expenditures totaled 97 billion dollars, or 2.6 percent of the GNP and 16 percent of all private capital investments in the economy.⁷ The number of scientists and engineers employed in the sphere of science (calculated in terms of full-time jobs) has reached, according to the National Science Foundation, 750,000. Some 2.8 million scientists and engineers are employed in the R & D sphere, representing 65 per 10,000 inhabitants. In terms of this indicator, the United States is ahead of all other capitalist countries (56 in Japan, 48 in the FRG, 33 in England and 32 in France).⁸

A lengthy process of development in the United States resulted in the formation of an infrastructure and a mechanism of scientific and technical progress. Its infrastructure consists of three economic sectors in which all innovations originate, mature, find practical application and are disseminated. These are the laboratories, research institutes, design bureaus and experimental production units of the private capitalist sector, government agencies, institutes and laboratories, and universities. All of the elements of this infrastructure are closely interrelated, forming a single system, and have certain specialties in the overall division of labor. For example, the private capitalist sector is responsible for the production and distribution (or dissemination) of technical innovations and any new goods and services meeting new public demands and for their removal from production when demand changes or is fully satisfied. The government sector defines the general guidelines of the strategy of economic and technological development, stimulates innovation in the country and conducts R & D projects of nationwide significance. The universities, in addition to training highly skilled personnel, serve as a constant generator of new scientific ideas, primarily of a theoretical nature, in all fields of knowledge.

With the aid of the diversified infrastructure of scientific and technical progress, science in the United States has now acquired a firm foothold in production. A unified scientific-production process has essentially been established in many industries (primarily those requiring high scientific input). The introduction of science into production was an important factor in the more intense collectivization of production and the development of capitalist production relations. Representing the other side of science's increasing subordination to capitalist needs, it gave rise to the separate business sphere of innovations, based on the race for additional profits from the development and manufacture of previously unavailable and sometimes unique items in great demand.

The mechanism of scientific and technical progress in the United States also consists of a few interacting parts (of course, it is not separate from the overall economic mechanism of capitalist development and is essentially the same). The basis of this mechanism is capitalist competition or the race for profits. "By its very nature," K. Marx wrote, "competition is nothing other than the internal nature of capital, its precise definition, reflected and realized in the reciprocal influence of many units of capital, nothing other than an internal tendency taking the form of an external need."⁹ Competition gives rise to the selection of producers in accordance with market conditions. It is capable of advancing the most effective producer of an innovation or of ruining him if there is no demand for this innovation. Around 80 percent of all new goods in the United States do not survive this competition.

Under present conditions, competition coexists with the monopoly and the economically active bourgeois government. The combination of all three components in a single fist makes up the mechanism of scientific and technical progress, which has essentially become the main generator of the development of productive forces in the leading capitalist countries. The government and the monopoly have contradictory effects on scientific and technical progress. In particular, the government not only stimulates the innovation process but also inhibits it by, for example, imposing protectionist restrictions. The monopoly not only strives to earn extra profits from the innovation but is also influenced by the tremendous force of inertia in the economy to preserve and compound the existing value of its capital. If it does not put a freeze on an invention capable of leading to the substantial reorganization of a long-established production process until the demand for the products manufactured with its aid declines, it could lose more profit than it earns. In this case, any innovation, even the most promising from the standpoint of general human needs, will be blocked immediately by the capitalist monopoly.

Nevertheless, the tendency toward the acceleration of scientific and technical progress is indisputably prevalent under the conditions of the technological revolution. The effects of this are varied, including the more pronounced intensification of production and changes in its concentration.

According to the calculations of many American researchers, scientific and technical progress have become the dominant factor of economic growth in the United States. According to various estimates, it secures from 40 to 65 percent of the increase in the GNP.¹⁰ Firms using the latest technology rank around twice as high as firms using traditional technology in terms of production growth rates and the creation of new jobs. Expenditures on R & D are the most important factor in enhancing competitive potential and product quality and conquering new sales markets.

But scientific and technical progress has its greatest impact on the use of the most basic production factors--manpower, fixed capital and raw materials.

Over the postwar period the average annual rate of increase in labor productivity in the U.S. economy was 2.2 percent. Maximum rates were reached in the 1960's (2.9 percent) and minimum rates in the 1970's (1.4 percent). The rates fell abruptly in 1980-1982 and then rose again. In 1983 the rate was 3.5 percent and in 1984 it was 2.6 percent.¹¹

Old machines and equipment--that is, those installed in the 1960's and 1970's--are now being replaced with new ones, especially equipment with a microelectronic "filling" and energy- and material-saving equipment. The result is the reduction or even the complete cessation of the production of old equipment and a substantial increase in the output of fundamentally new equipment. The tendency toward a decrease in the number of machine tools in the United States and an increase in the number of manufacturers is an important reflection of deep-seated processes of production intensification. According to a 1983 machine tool inventory, the number of these tools is 24 percent lower than it was in 1973, but the output of these tools has increased perceptibly. The production of computers, electronic components, machine tools with digital programmed control (DPC) and other equipment for comprehensive automation is growing rapidly. Between 1980 and 1984 the output of personal computers alone rose from 300,000 to 7.6 million.¹² Between 1975 and 1983 the proportion accounted for by computer expenditures in the private sector's total expenditures on equipment doubled and reached 14 percent.¹³ According to the inventory, the supply of DPC tools, which totaled 14,200 units in 1968, had increased to 103,300 by the end of 1983 (including 24,000 processing centers).¹⁴ The supply of industrial robots grew to around 6,000 units by the beginning of the 1980's.

According to the estimates of BUSINESS WEEK, the United States is undergoing "qualitative changes in the equipment of the processing industry. We are using more productive equipment, and we have sophisticated electronic control. The same machine can be used in the manufacture of five different products.... American industry is undergoing rapid modernization."¹⁵

The rising prices of raw materials and energy in the United States stimulated efforts to reduce the material and energy requirements of production. Attention has been focused on the incorporation of the appropriate technological processes, the reduction of the weight of machines, the conservation of raw materials and energy during all stages, from production to consumption, and the cultivation of economical habits. The amount of raw materials and energy conserved is now comparable to the annual increase in their production. There was a tendency toward an absolute reduction in energy consumption in the country at the beginning of the 1980's.

Contemporary scientific and technical progress, emphasizing microelectronics and the reduction of the size and weight of manufactured goods, is also making changes in the process of production concentration. When the founders of Marxism-Leninism discovered the law of the concentration and centralization of production and capital, leading to the formation of monopolies, they never believed that small- and medium-scale production would disappear or that the complex problem of the optimal size of enterprises would be solved in line with the idea of "the bigger, the better." V. I. Lenin repeatedly stressed that the monopoly originates and develops in the "extensive subsoil" of pre-monopolist capitalism and that "capitalism has always been generated and will always be generated by small-scale production."¹⁶

According to American statistics, the proportion accounted for by the largest corporations in total industrial capital has not increased in recent years.

For example, the share of the 200 top firms in the assets of companies of the U.S. processing industry rose from 47.7 percent to 60.4 percent between 1950 and 1970, but in subsequent years it stabilized at 59-60 percent without displaying any tendency toward further growth.¹⁷ The share of the same 200 firms in the net product of the processing industry rose from 30 to 43 percent between 1947 and 1972 and then fell to 34 percent in later years.¹⁸ The statistics of production concentration at enterprises of different sizes are even more indicative. Large enterprises (with 1,000 or more employees) in the processing industry now number only around 2,200-2,300, or 0.5 percent of the total. They account for 35 percent of the product. Medium-sized enterprises (from 100 to 1,000 employees) represent 7 percent of all plants and are responsible for 42 percent of the product. The remaining 23 percent is produced at small factories with less than 100 employees. This category takes in 92 percent of the enterprises in the processing industry, including 65 percent represented by the smallest enterprises (less than 10 employees).¹⁹

In general, the share of large enterprises in the total net product of this industry has decreased in the past two decades, and the share of medium-sized and small enterprises (especially those with under 20 or under 10 employees) has increased. This is a fundamentally different tendency from the pre-war trend toward an absolute and relative decrease in the number of small and medium-sized enterprises.

Tracing the development of the gigantic corporations, renowned American economist P. Samuelson wrote more than 40 years ago that "the power of these corporations did not appear all at once. Their relative importance in the economy increased constantly after 1900. During the 1930's and until World War II they held their relative positions on approximately the same level.... Recent economic studies have revealed the inaccuracy of the popular belief that the giants have been absorbing increasingly large segments of modern industry. Statistics indicate that the giants have apparently had to give up some of the relative positions they held 50 years ago."²⁰ The acceleration of scientific and technical progress in the United States has reaffirmed these statements: Each year hundreds of small firms and laboratories are opened in the country and actively market the latest scientific and technical achievements. Although many of these firms are later absorbed by large companies or go bankrupt, their activity does much to neutralize the monopolies' inherent tendency to impede scientific and technical progress.

Transformation of the System of State-Monopoly Regulation

The leading imperialist countries are now trying to accelerate economic growth, surmount crisis-related problems and adapt to the changing external and internal conditions of reproduction by means of the thorough reorganization of the system of state-monopoly regulation.

Constant government intervention in the economy is one of imperialism's main distinctive features.

The theory elaborated in the 1930's by J. Keynes laid an analytical foundation for this process by insisting on the need for broader government activity in

enlarging the market, regulating several macroproportions of reproduction and redistributing national income. The proportion accounted for by federal spending in the GNP rose from 18 percent in 1965 to 24 percent in 1984.²¹ In the 1970's, however, it became obvious that the previous system of state-monopoly intervention in the economy could not cope with stagflation and had exhausted its potential in general.

In the late 1970's and early 1980's reforms were instituted, first in England and then in the United States and some other countries, to replace the old system with a new one based on monetarism and supply-side economics. This "anti-Keynesian revolution" was most clearly reflected in the policies of the Reagan Administration. When Reagan took office on 20 January 1981, he said: "Paraphrasing Winston Churchill, I must say that I did not take the oath of office now just to watch the strongest economy in the world collapse." The Republicans set the objective of the widespread "reindustrialization" of the U.S. economy--in other words, its large-scale structural reorganization on the basis of accelerated scientific and technical progress, attacks on the rights of workers and a rise in labor exploitation norms. Their main goals were the reinforcement of U.S. international influence and the intensification of economic, scientific and technical expansion, specifically by weakening the positions gained in the past decade and a half by Japanese and West German capital in American and world markets.

After half a century of increasingly pronounced centralist tendencies in the practice of government regulation, the American bourgeoisie received a program emphasizing the principle of free private enterprise, the decentralization of control, the self-regulation of economic processes and the need for complete reliance on the competition mechanism. This put capitalism's "natural" features on a pedestal as a system of private economic organization. It would be wrong to believe, however, that this is simply a return to Say's ideas, to the freedom of pre-monopolist enterprise without government intervention.

Contemporary American capitalism is strong enough to free itself from the bonds of excessive government intervention in its affairs. At the same time, it is preserving and even strengthening the forms of government regulation which are most beneficial to it and without which it cannot cope. This entails putting government in its place in cases of the obvious infringement of capital's interests and securing the kind of combination of private initiative and government intervention that seems optimal at each specific level of development. Furthermore, the contemporary U.S. financial oligarchy is taking the responsibility for several regulating functions that have traditionally been assigned to government under different conditions.

The strategic move toward new principles of government regulation has taken four main directions: tax reform, a restrictive monetary policy, cuts in non-military government expenditures and reduced administrative economic regulation.

The tax reform, which was declared to be the center of the Reagan Administration's economic program and which was made law, cut taxes by 23 percent between 1981 and 1984.²² It was supposed to stimulate investments, but this

goal could not be attained during the years of economic crisis and the effects of the reform were felt only in the last 2 years. At the same time, the tax cuts complicated the problem of the budget deficit.

An important part of the tax reform was the change in depreciation rules, designed to accelerate the renewal of fixed capital and stimulate scientific and technical progress. Terms of depreciation were shortened by 40 percent and are now 3 years for cars, 5 years for industrial and agricultural equipment, 10 years for fixed capital in utilities and 15 years for most buildings.²³

The Federal Reserve System instituted a monetary policy designed to slow down the increase in the total amount of money in circulation (to the level of GNP growth rates in constant prices) and regulate loan interest rates. It alleviated the inflation problem. Interest rates are still being maintained on a level too high for the phase of economic recovery (12 percent). Now, however, this policy is less concerned with combating inflation (although this is still one of its aims) than with encouraging foreign capital investments in the United States.

Cuts in non-military government expenditures were supposed to reduce the budget deficit and, in general, decrease government involvement in U.S. economic affairs and stimulate private capital initiative. Substantial cuts (of 30-40 billion dollars a year) were made in a number of social programs (medical assistance, the creation of new jobs, rehabilitation, rent subsidies, school breakfasts, etc.). The main social programs (retirement and unemployment benefits) and the principle of cost-of-living raises in wages and pensions, however, remained virtually intact. For this reason, total social expenditures are increasing, but more slowly than before. Reaganists anticipate substantial cuts in social spending during Reagan's second term in office. To date, just a few types of taxes unaffected by the tax reform have been raised in order to reduce the budget deficit. All efforts to balance the budget, however, are cancelled out by the dramatic growth of military expenditures, and this will eventually increase the budget deficit.

The policy of reducing government regulation, or the policy of "deregulation," has not been carried out in full yet either. Its main results are anticipated in the near future, but many bureaucratic rules and obsolete regulations have already been abolished, and many earlier standards and rules have been radically relaxed in the spheres of environmental protection, equipment safety, health protection, consumer rights, etc. The number of civil servants has been reduced, and several functions of federal agencies have been turned over to states, cities and local agencies.

The policy of the Reagan Administration has produced perceptible results for the ruling class. The thorough structural reorganization of the national economy has been instituted, the rate of inflation has declined and scientific and technical progress has been accelerated. Big capital has launched a series of attacks on the working class, and the social activity of the latter has decreased. Important prerequisites have been established for the accelerated growth of labor productivity, the enhancement of production efficiency, the elevation of profit norms and the improvement of the general conditions of

reproduction. The crisis of 1980-1982 in the U.S. economy was followed by a recovery phase: The rate of inflation is still low. The rate of unemployment is lower than it was during the crisis: 9.7 percent in 1982 and 7.5 percent in 1984.²⁴

In spite of the high growth rates of industrial production (10 percent in 1984), however, output is just slightly in excess of the pre-crisis output of 5 years ago.²⁵ The Republican administration has been unable to keep several important socioeconomic promises. After promising, for example, to substantially reduce and then eradicate the budget deficit, it compounded it, setting something of a record. After promising to reduce the rate of unemployment to 8.9 percent in 1982 and 7.9 percent in 1983, it actually contributed to its rise to a level unprecedented since the time of the "great depression." Although the present phase of economic recovery lowered it to a level comparable to the 1980 rate, the absolute number of unemployed in the United States is now higher than it was before the Republicans entered the White House: 7.4 million people in 1980 and 8.5 million in summer 1984, according to Department of Labor statistics (incidentally, these are lower than the statistics of labor unions).

In general, the Reagan Administration's efforts to solve several problems in the American economy have given rise to relatively new conflicts in the socioeconomic and political spheres.

Old and New Conflicts

The militarization of the economy in the United States--just as, incidentally, in other imperialist states--is the main factor contributing to the accumulation of "explosive material" at the present time. It deforms scientific and technical progress and the internal and external conditions of capitalist reproduction.

The military sector of the American economy diverts large quantities of financial, material and labor resources from the normal reproductive process, which disrupts the balance between the supply of the main production factors and the demand for them and results in a sequential chain of negative events: rising prices, resource shortages, the reduced competitive potential of American goods in the world market, etc. Militarization actually reorients scientific and technical progress primarily toward military and space projects. These projects are absorbing a high percentage, unprecedented in peacetime, of the R & D budget (around a third). In view of the specific nature of the products, the latest weapon systems, the results of military R & D frequently conflict with the need for economical and profitable production. It is no coincidence that even American economists make frequent references to the surplus of so-called "white elephants" of military technology, which might be state-of-the-art equipment but are seriously jeopardizing national economic development. The military establishment's strict control of military R & D objectives and the expenditure of other resources also limits the possibility of using some of the results of these projects for the needs of the economy as a whole.

Rising military expenditures, which are increasingly likely to be covered by government loans, have become the main cause of the high bank interest rates, which restrict the business community's access to credit and thereby restrict investments. Excessive expenditures on weapons have led to the unprecedented federal budget deficit. It is true that it still represents only a small portion of the gross national product, despite its impressive size, and it does not represent as visible or tangible a danger to the average American as, for example, inflation or depression. Nevertheless, America's tendency to live "beyond its means" and to develop "on credit" is certainly casting shadows on its economic horizon. Besides this, the repayment of loans and credit used to cover government expenditures is already diverting large sums from productive use. It will take over 100 billion dollars just to pay the interest on the growing public debt in the current fiscal year.

Funds are also being diverted from the resolution of problems stemming from scientific and technical progress and connected with the earlier obsolescence of equipment, the structural crisis of the economy, the growth of unemployment, the changing structure of the labor force, environmental pollution, etc.

There is still an extremely large sector of obsolete industries and production units requiring modernization, remodeling or replacement with imports in the U.S. economy. Ferrous metallurgy and the automotive, construction, shipbuilding, textile, food, leather footwear and wood processing industries have been stricken by a structural crisis. According to available estimates, colossal capital investments exceeding a trillion dollars will be needed for the modernization of the American economy in line with the higher parameters of competition.²⁶ Under the conditions of militarization, this is a virtually unbearable burden for the United States.

The incorporation of qualitatively new technology, machines and equipment reduces the demand for manpower and increases unemployment. The use of robots could lead to an increase of up to 90 percent, depending on specific production conditions, in labor productivity.²⁷ The problem of personnel training and retraining is growing more acute because the educational system is not keeping up with new occupations and specialties. This is lowering indicators of manpower use. According to American statistics, for example, around 60 percent of the decrease in the growth rate of U.S. labor productivity over the past decade and a half has been due to the discrepancy between the skills of many workers and the changing requirements of modern production.²⁸

The dramatic exacerbation of the ecological crisis and the pernicious effects of modern production on the environment and the individual are among the serious negative effects of scientific and technical progress. Almost a century and a half ago, K. Marx remarked in a letter to F. Engels that "if culture develops spontaneously instead of being consciously directed, it leaves behind a wasteland."²⁹ These words sound particularly pertinent at this time. Some recent American studies have been less inclined to praise the "consumer society," as they did in the past, than to criticize the "polluter society."

According to the authors of "Reaganomics," private enterprise freed from excessive government patronage can cope with these problems. Both the

scales of these problems and past experience, however, naturally raise suspicions about the farsightedness of these assumptions. Furthermore, the Republican economic program itself is not devoid of contradictions. For example, the tax cut complicated the problem of the budget deficit, and few will dare to say that the American society has escaped inflation.

The average income of Americans decreased until 1983 and began to increase only during the phase of economic recovery. In 1984 it exceeded the 1980 figure but was lower than in 1972. Its growth in recent years has therefore been of a compensatory nature.³⁰ According to the data of the American Urban Institute, the average American began to live better in 1984 than "4 years ago." However, the income of rich Americans increased by 9 percent during this period, that of middle-income families increased by 1 percent, and that of low-income Americans decreased by 8 percent. Although 7 million new jobs were created, the number of poor increased by 6 million: from 29 million (13 percent of the population) in 1980 to 35 million (15.2 percent) in 1984. The gap between the incomes of the white and colored populations is also growing wider.

In general, "Reaganomics" gave substantial advantages to many wealthy Americans and put the laboring public in a worse position, limiting their ability to learn new occupations and their territorial mobility in line with the structural reorganization of the economy during the current stage of the technological revolution. It was certainly no coincidence that J. Bernal, one of the first theorists of the technological revolution, concluded that "the technical potential and, what is more, the control that could be achieved with the proper use of calculating machines cannot be compatible with the variety of private interests and the practice of human exploitation."³¹ In other words, capitalism is incapable of securing stable scientific and technical progress in the public interest.

The increasing economic interdependence of the three centers of imperialism is becoming one of its salient features. Under these conditions, the United States' resolute efforts to leave its competitors far behind could exacerbate inter-imperialist conflicts, and the results of this are difficult to predict at the present time. By keeping interest rates high, American imperialism has caused other countries to export capital on a grand scale. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, imported capital from Western Europe reached 92.9 billion dollars in 1983 and around 100 billion in 1984.

Addressing the International Chamber of Commerce in Stockholm in June 1984, Henry Ford II said that "the dramatic shift in the flow of capital...could lead to a situation in which Europe might experience an acute shortage of capital at a time when funds are urgently needed to revive its economy." At the same time, the high exchange rate of the dollar (and the resulting influx of foreign capital) has given rise to the unfamiliar problem of foreign debts and is reducing the competitive potential of American goods in foreign markets and within the country. As a result of this, the American economy is now experiencing the largest deficit in its history in foreign trade and in its balance of payments. The American economy is more "open" than ever before. It is growing more and more difficult and costly for the United

States to keep the position of leader of the capitalist world. In spite of the intensification of inter-imperialist rivalry, it is more dependent on the outside world, particularly on sources of raw materials, energy, capital, scientific and technical achievements and many manufactured goods.

The complication of the objective conditions of contemporary American imperialism's existence necessitates thorough appraisals of internal problems of reproduction, the intensification of socioeconomic conflicts and external problems connected with the intensification of inter-imperialist rivalry. New developments in both of these areas require in-depth analyses of many current facts with the aid of Lenin's theory of imperialism. V. I. Lenin said that "we must prove that we have not only memorized yesterday's lessons by heart,"³² but are also making advances in the comprehension of the objective processes of capitalist development.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 4, p 184.
2. S. I. Tyul'panov and V. L. Sheynis, "Aktual'nyye problemy politicheskoy ekonomii sovremennogo kapitalizma" [Current Problems of the Political Economy of Contemporary Capitalism], Leningrad, 1973, pp 6-7.
3. "SSSR v tsifrakh v 1983 godu" [USSR Statistics, 1983], Moscow, 1984, pp 50-51.
4. Ibid., p 53; MEMO, 1984, No 9, p 5.
5. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 27, p 422.
6. Ibid., vol 5, pp 137-138.
7. "National Patterns of Science and Technology Resources 1984," Wash., 1984, pp 28, 37; "Economic Report of the President 1985," Wash., 1985, p 232.
8. "National Patterns of Science and Technology Resources 1984," pp 36-37, 76.
9. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 46, pt I, p 391.
10. See, for example, SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1971, No 7, pp 46-47; E. Denison, "Accounting for Slower Economic Growth. The United States in the 1970's," Wash., 1979, p 122.
11. Calculated according to: MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, February 1984, pp 100-101; "Economic Report of the President 1984," Wash., 1984, p 189.
12. BIKI, 21 February 1985.
13. FORTUNE, 3 October 1983, p 63.

14. AMERICAN MACHINIST, 1983, No 11.
15. BUSINESS WEEK, 16 July 1984, p 46.
16. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 48, p 155; vol 17, p 25.
17. MEMO, 1983, No 5, p 105.
18. "Statistical Abstract of the United States," Wash., 1984, p 780.
19. SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1983, No 2, pp 30-32.
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21. "Industrial Policy Movement in the United States: Is It the Answer?" Wash., 1984, p IX.
22. KOMMUNIST, 1982, No 16, p 99.
23. Ibid., p 100.
24. "Economic Report of the President 1985," p 273.
25. EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA, 1985, No 2, p 21.
26. SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1980, No 10, p 28.
27. "America's Economic Problems and Prospects," Wash., 1983, p 150.
28. "Technology and Employment. Joint Hearings," Wash., 1983, p 828.
29. K. Marx and F. Engels, Op. cit., vol 32, p 45.
30. "Economic Report of the President 1985," p 277.
31. "Nauka o nauke" [Science on Science], Moscow, 1966, p 259.
32. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 45, p 307.

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AMERICAN MISSILES OVER CANADA

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 85 (signed to press 16 Apr 85) pp 59-66

[Article by Ye. V. Israelyan]

[Text] As one of its first moves in the military sphere, the Conservative Mulroney government authorized the use of Canada's territory and air space for a series of tests of American cruise missiles. At the beginning of 1985 the Canadian Ministry of National Defense announced the schedules of these tests in January, February and March. In accordance with this, on 16 January 1985 American B-52 strategic bombers with four missiles on board flew over Canadian territory, covering a total of around 2,500 kilometers over the Yukon through the Northwest Territories and British Columbia to the Cold Lake testing ground in Alberta Province. During subsequent tests on 19 and 25 February, missiles were launched from bombers for autonomous flight in Canada's air space.

The Conservative government's position on this matter is completely in accord with the ruling party's main foreign policy objectives of stronger Canadian-American cooperation, including in the military sphere. Following in the wake of U.S. policy, the Conservatives have supported virtually all American administration military programs of the 1970's and 1980's. For example, during their brief previous term in power, they unconditionally supported the December (1979) NATO decision on the deployment of American nuclear missiles in Western Europe. In November 1979 the Conservative government of J. Clark authorized the United States to test radar equipment for cruise missiles in Canada's western provinces. Later the leaders of the Progressive Conservative Party and its parliamentary faction insisted that the Liberals conclude an agreement with the United States on tests of American weapon systems. It is noteworthy, for example, that all seven candidates for the office of party leader unanimously favored the testing of cruise missiles in Canada at the party convention in 1983. After the Conservatives won the 1984 election, they willingly and unhesitatingly sanctioned the next program of tests of this dangerous weapon.

The Canadian Government's decision aroused heated debates in ruling circles and in various Canadian parties on matters of war and peace. Huge peace marches and rallies were held in Canada's largest cities, Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal, under the slogans "Ban the cruise missile" and "Abolish the Canadian-American Agreement on Tests of American Weapons in Canada."

It would be useful to examine the fundamentals of this agreement, which was inherited by the Conservatives from the Liberal government of P. Trudeau, and the reasons why the Liberals took such a dangerous step, a step obviously contrary to their aim of stronger national independence. It is also important to analyze the possible effects of this agreement on the future of the world in general and Canada in particular.

The decision to conclude an agreement on tests of American weapon systems in Canada was made under the conditions of the perceptible exacerbation of Canadian-American conflicts in the beginning of the 1980's. The deterioration of these relations was connected primarily with the Trudeau government's economic plans and undertakings: the institution of the National Energy Program and the plans for stricter control over foreign investments in the country. Disagreements between P. Trudeau and R. Reagan also extended to the sphere of foreign policy. For example, they had differing views on relations with developing countries. Trudeau insisted on increased economic aid to these states from developed capitalist countries, while Reagan planned to reduce this aid. They did not agree on events in Central America either: Trudeau repeatedly criticized U.S. military intervention in the affairs of the states of this region. Serious disagreements also existed with regard to matters of war and peace. In general, the Canadian prime minister invariably supported the preservation and continuation of the policy of detente. Reagan's actions and statements, on the other hand, were aimed at reversing this process and escalating international tension.

Faced by this broad range of conflicts, the Trudeau government assigned priority to its economic goals.¹ For this purpose, it made concessions in the sphere of foreign and military policy. For example, contrary to the expectations of politicians and the press, at the conference of the "big seven" in Williamsburg in May 1983 Canada did not focus attention on its disagreements with the United States over aid to developing countries. Furthermore, the United States was able to win Canada's approval of U.S.-staged "free elections" in El Salvador. Ottawa's consent to the tests of American weapon systems, however, was the Americans' greatest achievement.

To obtain this consent, the United States began to exert constant pressure on the Canadians in the early 1980's. In fall 1980 President J. Carter first asked P. Trudeau to allow tests of cruise missiles in the Canadian air space. That same year, the matter was discussed at a session of the U.S.-Canadian permanent combined defense council. During his first visit to Ottawa in March 1981, R. Reagan solicited the authorization of these tests. Vice-President G. Bush also insisted on immediate tests during his visit to this country in March 1983. A particularly unceremonious approach was taken by P. Robinson, the American ambassador to Canada, who even threatened that Ottawa's denial of American requests would lead to the severance of diplomatic relations.

To substantiate the need for the use of Canada's territory and air space, members of the U.S. military command made open references to the similarity of Canada's geographic and climatic conditions to those of the Soviet Union. The tests, according to the Pentagon's plans, were supposed to aid in revealing

the effects of low temperatures on the tactical engineering features of air-based cruise missiles and judge their ability to operate under natural conditions close to those in the Soviet Union. Besides this, the existence of an air corridor from Canada's arctic coastline to Cold Lake in Alberta Province gave the Americans their first opportunity to launch a missile along a relatively straight trajectory (in the United States they had flown only in circles due to the absence of testing grounds of this type).

The brewing conflict with the Americans over the missile tests under the conditions of the existing friction in relations between the two countries eventually motivated P. Trudeau to define his position. In a letter to R. Reagan in December 1981, he consented in principle to the negotiation of an agreement.

The decision was also affected directly by the overall deterioration of the international situation in the early 1980's. These changes in the international climate were used by U.S. ruling circles to issue "cold war" demands to their allies, insisting that the mythical "Soviet military threat" must be countered by strict Western discipline.

Ottawa's interest in profitable military contracts was also an important factor. It is known, for example, that Litton Systems, a Canadian firm, received an order from the Pentagon for steering systems for the same cruise missiles that were supposed to be tested in Canada as early as 1978. In subsequent years, the Canadian Government was able to negotiate other deals for this firm. Between 1979 and 1982 alone, it received 43.4 million Canadian dollars, with 26.4 million specifically for the manufacture of steering systems for American cruise missiles. Besides this, the Americans took another step to obtain Ottawa's consent to the tests. They offered Canadian companies contracts worth 3.1 billion Canadian dollars for the manufacture of components for CF-18 fighter planes. In this way, Canada received substantial compensation for turning the country into a U.S. missile testing ground.

The general Canadian-American agreement on tests of American weapon systems in Canada was signed in Washington on 10 February 1983. It stipulated that no nuclear, chemical or biological materials intended for military use could be used on Canadian territory. The American side assumed the cost of all projects. Canada's right to participate in all tests conducted within the framework of the agreement was underscored, as was its right to cancel or postpone any specific program.

As soon as the agreement had been signed, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs A. MacEachen tried to calm the public by alleging that no final decision had been made on the tests. The text of the agreement, however, indicated the opposite. It mentioned cruise missiles twice: The delivery of cruise missiles to Canada without warheads was discussed in one point, and the choice of the air corridor for their testing was mentioned in another. Therefore, there was no question that only formal confirmation of the Canadian side's consent would be required for the testing of the missiles.

The Americans received this consent on 15 July 1983. That day the government issued a press release signed by A. MacEachen and Minister of National

Defense G. Lamontagne. The first test of a missile was conducted on 2 March 1984.

Justifying their decision to allow the tests, P. Trudeau and members of his cabinet asserted that this step, first of all, was a consequence of Canada's membership in NATO; secondly, was necessary to motivate the USSR to conduct "serious" arms limitation talks; and, thirdly, met the interests of Canadian security. Critics of this decision from the parliamentary opposition, experts on military strategy, politicians, public spokesmen, journalists and peace movement activists systematically refuted these arguments.

The first argument was untenable because the agreement on the tests was negotiated and concluded not within the NATO framework, but on a purely bilateral basis by Canada and the United States, at a time when there was still no consensus among NATO members as to the prospects for the use of this weapon system. The statements by Canadian officials that the conclusion of the agreement on the tests was necessitated by Canada's obligations to its allies were essentially refuted by FRG Defense Minister M. Woerner during his visit to Canada in summer 1983. He said at that time that since NATO had no plans to use the air-based cruise missile, the conclusion of the Canadian-American agreement was of no consequence to bloc members.

The second argument, according to the opponents of the agreement, was founded from the very beginning on the false assumption that the Soviet Union could be influenced from a position of strength. Just as in the past, they noted, this kind of blackmail for the purpose of gaining unilateral concessions from the USSR had no chance of success.

The third argument, as the critics of the agreement demonstrated, was also groundless. In fact, Ottawa's decision complicated the problem of Canadian security because the development of an air-based cruise missile in the West in spite of the Soviet Union's persistent appeals not to develop this new nuclear weapon system has faced the USSR with the need to take reciprocal measures to develop a similar system. This, in turn, should revive the Pentagon's earlier interest in using Canadian territory for the deployment of weapons to protect the United States against a retaliatory strike in the event of a nuclear conflict.

The assumptions of Canadian experts were quickly corroborated by actual events. The conclusion of the agreement led to decisions to modernize the detection and warning systems in Canada. In March 1985 a Canadian-American agreement was concluded on the modernization of the early warning system established in the Canadian Arctic in the 1950's. Therefore, the consent to the tests marked the beginning of a new stage in Canada's involvement in American nuclear strategy, threatening the Canadians with a national catastrophe. Furthermore, as the opponents of this decision have stressed, the Canadian Government took on the heavy burden of starting a new round of the arms race in conjunction with the Americans. After all, the air-based cruise missile is not only a new weapon, but is also a particularly destabilizing type of first-strike weapon in view of the obvious difficulty of controlling its deployment and its high accuracy.

The opponents of the tests also pointed out the fact that while the United States was insisting on this kind of agreement, it was simultaneously trying to compromise Canada in the eyes of the world public and undermine Trudeau's own authority in Canada and abroad.

The opponents of the agreement also criticized the very procedure of the discussion of American requests for tests and the mechanism of negotiating agreements with the United States. For example, the general Canadian-American agreement assigned all of the responsibility for decisions on the tests exclusively to the defense agencies of the two countries and did not give the Canadian Government, Parliament or Foreign Ministry any say in the matter. Besides this, the publication of information about scheduled tests required the preliminary consent of the American side. Stressing the pro-American sentiments of officials in the Canadian Ministry of National Defense, the critics of the agreement correctly asserted that its conclusion would substantially increase Canadian military policy's already excessive dependence on Pentagon behavior. Therefore, the general 1983 agreement on tests of American weapon systems in Canada laid the foundation for extremely dangerous Canadian-American cooperation in the development and improvement of new weapons of mass destruction. The very fact that a long-range military agreement was concluded with the United States--for the first time since the NORAD agreement was signed in 1958²--was of fundamental significance. The text of the agreement was also a departure from the norm. Despite the fact that Canada had already participated in tests of various American weapons in the past, it had never officially been assigned the role of a U.S. missile testing ground.

The conclusion of the 1983 Canadian-American agreement and the commencement of cruise missile tests aroused public indignation in Canada.

The parliamentary faction of the New Democratic Party (NDP) proposed numerous draft resolutions condemning the government's consent to allow the use of national territory for the implementation of U.S. militarist plans and demanding the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Canada. The promise to cancel the tests was one of the most important campaign promises of NDP candidates for the office of prime minister of Canada in the 1984 campaign.

Canada's communists are distinguished among the 1983 agreement's many opponents with all of their diverse political views by their consistency and the validity of their arguments. In a special statement, the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party directed special attention to the fact that the American cruise missiles are completely out of Canada's control although Canada will nevertheless bear the burden of blame for cooperation in the development of this new and extremely dangerous weapon system. At a press conference on 13 February 1985, Secretary General W. Kashtan of the Communist Party asked the government to pursue an independent foreign policy and dissociate itself from the Reagan Administration's militarist preparations. He said that the Communist Party of Canada advocates the creation of a broad extraparlimentary coalition made up of progressive and democratic forces and farmers', women's and young people's organizations to exert pressure on the Conservative government for a domestic and foreign policy corresponding to the vital interests of the Canadian people.

The movement to stop the testing of the cruise missiles has a broad social base. The most diverse groups and strata of Canadian society are represented in it.

The Canadian working class is becoming an increasingly active fighter for peace. Such influential labor unions as the United Automobile Workers, the Postal Workers Union and the United Electricians took an active part in the new antiwar campaign. The tests have been opposed most vehemently by labor unions in Quebec, where virtually all organizations have joined the movement.

The conclusion of the Canadian-American agreement on the tests also had a direct effect on the position taken by the leaders of the largest central labor organization, the Canadian Labor Congress (CLC). Whereas rightwing elements in its leadership opposed participation by labor unions in the antiwar campaign in the early 1980's, in March 1983 the CLC Executive Committee passed a resolution condemning Ottawa's decision to allow the use of Canadian territory for American tests and appealing for the curtailment of the Canadian-American joint arms production program.³ Cardinal changes in the position of CLC leaders were attested to by one of the resolutions of the last CLC congress in May-June 1984. It demanded reciprocal and balanced arms reductions and the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Canada and declared support for the movement to cancel tests of American weapon systems.

Farmers and agricultural workers are becoming more involved in the movement to ban the tests. This process is most characteristic of the Canadian west, where the inhabitants of farms, towns and communities located near the Cold Lake testing ground are protesting the tests. It is indicative that the National Farmers Union, the main organization of Canadian farmers, issued an appeal for a ban on tests of American cruise missiles in the country. The involvement of these groups in the movement is elevating their consciousness and promoting their more thorough understanding of international issues.

The Canadian scientific intelligentsia has been active in the antiwar campaign. Scientists and artists are striving to use their authority to influence government policy. In December 1984, 78 prominent public, labor and religious leaders and scientists asked B. Mulroney to deny the Americans' request for new tests.

Religious organizations are playing an important role in the struggle to cancel the 1983 agreement. All of the large churches in Canada have condemned the cruise missile tests and asked the government to stop them in February 1984. It is significant that the antiwar campaign has been joined not only by traditionally pacifistic religious communities, such as the Quakers, but also by one as conservative as the Catholic Church.

In connection with this, it must be said that the involvement of groups with differing levels of class awareness, religious beliefs, political views and levels of awareness of the causes and consequences of the arms race in the antiwar campaign is giving rise to some difficulties in the development of cooperation by public organizations fighting for the cancellation of the tests. The attempts of movement activists to establish a single organizational center have been unsuccessful to date (there are now more than a

thousand groups and organizations in the country and their actions are poorly coordinated and often appear spontaneous). The consolidation of the movement is being impeded severely by regionalism in Canadian public life and the public mind. For this reason, the slogans calling for the cessation of tests of American missiles in Canada and for the creation of a nuclear-free zone are particularly important in this atmosphere of organizational disunity. These slogans are appealing and comprehensible to each Canadian, regardless of his ethnic background and place of residence, and they can therefore create new opportunities for the consolidation of the entire movement. It is no coincidence that virtually all peace organizations support these slogans, despite the differences in their programs and forms of action.

The Canadian progressive public has used the most diverse ways of expressing antiwar feelings in protests against the Ottawa-Washington nuclear missile bargain. They include rallies, demonstrations and peace marches. The Canadian fighters for peace launched the sweeping "Peace Caravans" antiwar campaign. A coalition of peace organizations was formed to supervise it. Its executive committee includes representatives from the Canadian Peace Congress, the CLC and the "Project Plow" coalition, uniting religious groups and some public organizations, including the largest women's organization in Canada, "Women's Voice," and others. A petition circulated as part of the campaign was signed by 430,000 people. In October 1984 the petition was submitted to the leaders of the country's three main political parties--Liberal, Progressive Conservative and New Democratic. The national campaign was an important step toward the unification of Canadian forces for peace.

The suit brought against the federal government by a coalition of 26 peace organizations in fall 1983 was an important event in domestic politics. This was the first time this form of struggle was used by Canadian peace movement activists. The coalition petitioned a court of appeals and then the Supreme Court to rule that Ottawa was behaving unconstitutionally when it consented to the cruise missile tests. The organizations accused the government of violating the liberties and security guaranteed to Canadian citizens in the constitutional Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The bourgeois courts, which guard the interests of the ruling class, predictably pronounced these demands illegal, but the very fact that the case was heard in court was an important victory for the peace movement. Besides this, the trial was also important because it aroused the interest of broad segments of the Canadian public and demonstrated the determination of the opponents of the tests to find new ways of influencing the government.

The movement for the cancellation of the 1983 agreement spread through the country in the first half of the 1980's and had a substantial effect on the policies of local government agencies. In September 1984 the Vancouver municipal government decided to hold a referendum on the prohibition of tests of American cruise missiles in Canada. Vancouver municipal authorities asked other cities in British Columbia to follow this example and to join the struggle to declare the province a nuclear-free zone and organize a national referendum on the cruise missile tests in Canada. The proposals were supported by 14 municipal governments in British Columbia. Several cities advanced their own peace initiatives, particularly the nuclear freeze referendum. Besides this, under public pressure around 90 municipal

governments declared their cities nuclear-free zones, including such large centers as Toronto, Vancouver and Regina. The nuclear-free cities served as an indicator of the negative Canadian feelings about the military policy of their government and the foreign policy of the United States. Besides this, the creation of local nuclear-free zones attests eloquently to the growing strength of the peace movement in the country.

Later events proved that the antiwar public and the opposition to the government within the dominant class could not attain their main goal--the denial of American requests for cruise missile tests. The massive campaign for the cancellation of the tests did, however, have a direct effect on the proceedings and results of Canadian-American talks on this matter. For example, the lengthy postponement of the tests (from December 1981, when Ottawa first announced its decision, to March 1984, when the first test was conducted) was an important achievement of forces for peace. Besides this, the scales of the movement were so broad that ruling circles were able to use its unprecedented growth as leverage to gain concessions from the United States during the talks. It is known that Canadian officials insisted on the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement, and then of a separate one, on the cruise missiles. Substantiating this demand, Canadian representatives made references to the definite opposition in the country to this weapon and the need for the most thorough preparation of public opinion for the tests. As a result, the Canadian Government was able to include an important statement in the agreement--a statement stipulating the negotiation of separate agreements on each specific type of weapon to be tested in the future. This did much to limit the Americans' freedom of action in planning and conducting the tests.

When the Progressive Conservative Party took charge in fall 1984, reactionary circles in Canada acquired more influence in military policymaking. This is attested to specifically by the government's intention to increase Canada's military expenditures, its armed forces and its military contribution to NATO and to allow the use of Canada's territory and air space for tests of American cruise missiles. The expansion of tests of American weapons in Canada is a possibility. When the Conservatives determine their approach to matters of military policy, however, they will nevertheless have to consider the increasing activity of antiwar forces in the country, which now have, as events have proved, considerable political influence.

FOOTNOTES

1. For more detail, see S. F. Molochkov, "Pierre Trudeau Resigns," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1984, No 6--Editor's note.
2. Since 1958 the operational control of North American air defense has been exercised in line with the American-Canadian agreement of North American Air Defense (NORAD) and virtually monopolized by the Americans. Since 1981 it has been called the agreement on the North American aerospace defense command (for more detail, see S. F. Molochkov, "Evolution of Canadian Military Policy," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1980, No 3--Editor's note).

3. When Ottawa concluded an agreement with the United States on the joint production of weapons in 1958, it hoped to strengthen the Canadian military industry. What actually happened, however, was that Canadian enterprises which once produced complex items are now being converted more and more for the delivery of components and parts to the United States for American military equipment (for more detail, see "Kanada na poroge 80-kh godov" [Canada on the Threshold of the 1980's], Moscow, 1979, p 328--Editor's note).

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KAMPELMAN-BRZEZINSKI-JASTROW ARTICLE ON SDI HIT

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 85 (signed to press 16 Apr 85) pp 66-70

[Article by V. I. Bogachev: "Dubious Arguments of the Supporters of 'Star Wars'"]

[Text] Shortly before the start of the Soviet-American negotiations on space and nuclear arms in Geneva, THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE published the article "Defense in Space--Is Far From 'Star Wars.'" It can be seen from the title alone that the article's authors--M. Kampelman, Z. Brzezinski and R. Jastrow--had set themselves the task of justifying the aim of the Reagan Administration to deploy in space American weapons systems virtually intended for waging a nuclear war on earth, and also of covering up Washington's policy of developing a large-scale antimissile system with space-based elements.

In its basic conclusions and in the arguments which it makes use of, the article differs little from official Pentagon and White House documents and from public statements by representatives of the present administration in defense of Reagan's so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative." It also contains pompous phrases about the "need to save mankind from the balance of terror" and about Washington's intention to "make nuclear weapons powerless and obsolete." The article repeats the absurd promises of the present U.S. administration to "make an important contribution to the cause of arms control and to strengthen stability" by deploying an "antimissile shield" over the territory of the United States.

Interest in the article within the United States itself and abroad was caused to a considerable extent by the fact that one of its three authors, Max Kampelman, is now head of the American delegation at the new Soviet-American negotiations, the aim of which, as the joint statement by the two countries of 8 January 1985 said, is "to prevent the arms race in outer space and to end it on earth." As commentators note, the article published in the magazine, side by side with the repetition of the American propaganda thesis regarding the "beneficial consequences" of the militarization of outer space, also reveals some important aspects of the U.S. administration's position regarding negotiations with the Soviet Union.

The article in THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE also attracted public attention because Max Kampelman attempted--unsuccessfully, it is true--to block its

publication or at least to remove his signature from it, evidently in the fear, and not without good grounds, of an unfavorable reaction to some White House aims on the questions of war and peace, which are expounded very frankly in the article.

At the very beginning of the article the authors expound their credo regarding possible ways of solving these problems, which, as becomes clear, is wholly based on the known concept, advanced by R. Reagan's circle, of achieving "the reduction of both sides' arms through a preliminary buildup of arms by the United States."

"It is an accepted view that in the nuclear age, stability is ensured by efforts made in two opposite directions," the article says, "striving to acquire increasingly effective nuclear weapons on the one hand and negotiating to limit and reduce these weapons on the other." The authors, including M. Kampelman, have a clear preference for the former direction--that is, the buildup of American nuclear potential. While recognizing that the way to strengthening stability which they propose "cannot be called attractive," they nevertheless contend that the course of reaching and agreement with the Soviet Union will supposedly "require a more favorable climate than that which now exists." Moreover, in listing a number of conditions under which agreement with the USSR would be possible, the authors in the same breath declare them to be unrealistic. At the same time, the article expresses criticism of "peace supporters" who proclaim the traditional arms control negotiations to be the main task.

Kampelman and his coauthors virtually propose that the Soviet Union give the "go-ahead" to the United States to be the first to create a large antimissile system, maintaining that the United States will then share its information on it with the USSR. In their words, such a scenario of "agreement" with the USSR "would promote not only the stabilization of the situation, but also the conclusion of more far-reaching arms control agreements." In coming out with "initiatives" such as this, the authors clearly underestimate the common sense of their readers, both American and foreign.

It follows from the article in THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE that the American delegation in Geneva is now headed by a man who considers the achievement of agreement with the Soviet Union on nuclear and space arms to be impossible. After the announcement of the members of the U.S. delegation to the Geneva talks, led by M. Kampelman, the West German FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU newspaper noted with some sarcasm that "the American team includes only people who have passed the test for a certificate of hostility toward the cause of disarmament."

At the end of March, President Reagan urgently called Kampelman to Washington and charged him with an assignment which, to say the least, is unusual for the head of a delegation at disarmament negotiations. As the American NBC network reported, Kampelman had to "convince Congress that the United States needs to have more nuclear weapons."

Kampelman was thus charged in Washington with promoting the buildup of those weapon systems on the reduction of which he was officially expected to reach an agreement in Geneva.

M. Kampelman, Z. Brzezinski and R. Jastrow maintain that the offensive arms race "cannot be an acceptable long-term option" and it seems impossible to disagree with them here. However, the strategic offensive arms race does not suit them because, in their opinion, the "strategy of mutual security" should provide for the "combination of an ABM system with offensive arms," and not because it undermines stability and intensifies the danger of war. In their opinion, the U.S. buildup of offensive nuclear systems should be supplemented by an arms race in space.

"We should not abandon the means of nuclear deterrence until we are convinced that we have more reliable methods at our disposal," the authors say. The article does not, however, give a clear answer to the question of when these "more reliable methods," which, as Reagan promises, will make nuclear weapons "obsolete and meaningless," might appear.

In this connection it should be recalled that R. DeLauer, former U.S. assistant secretary of defense, stated in answer to a question by Senator S. Nunn that he had no idea at what level of antimissile defense effectiveness the Pentagon would be ready to abandon the buildup of offensive strategic arms.

The article further notes that both the United States and the USSR are experiencing "serious concern" about the tension which is resulting from the creation of new high-precision missiles capable of being used for a first strike. However, by following the rules of the "double standard" method which has been well mastered by American propaganda, the authors assert that the concern of the United States is fully justified, whereas there are supposedly no grounds for the Soviet Union to be concerned.

At the same time, the February report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the U.S. Congress recognizes the existence of "approximate nuclear parity between the Soviet Union and the United States." Even President Reagan himself announced in a moment of frankness to a delegation of American young people in autumn of last year: "As far as forces are concerned, we (the United States and the USSR) are almost equal." Nevertheless, such evaluations of the general balance of forces between the USSR and the United States do not prevent the three authors from appearing in the pages of a respectable American publication with truly fantastic assertions that "in response to one launching by us (the Americans), the Russians could make three launchings" of strategic nuclear warheads. The authors required such falsifications in order to "prove" that the United States is now supposedly faced by the choice: "Either die or submit to nuclear blackmail." The third way out offered by Kampelman and the two other experts, and the "only acceptable" way for the United States, consists, predictably, in the deployment of a large-scale antimissile system with space-based elements, in accordance with Reagan's "star wars" plan.

It follows quite clearly from the article that the present U.S. administration regards the "Strategic Defense Initiative" as being far from an intention to conduct "research" with the aim of subsequently resolving the question of this system, but as a concrete plan for deploying and using space weapons. The

technology of creating an antimissile system "is almost in our hands," the authors announce. In their words, for the plans to create space weapons to be implemented in practice, it will only be necessary to wait until confusion in the technical sphere is cleared up.

Kampelman, Brzezinski and Jastrow do not even attempt to refute the claims of specialists that the Reagan Administration intends to create an antimissile system in order to ensure the "relative invulnerability" of the United States in case the American side inflicts a nuclear first strike. Discussing the effectiveness of a two-tier antimissile system, the authors assert that it "would not guarantee absolutely reliable protection from a Soviet retaliatory strike in the case of a possible first strike by our (American!) side," and for this reason, they say, "the Russians' concern" about such a threat is "inappropriate."

But Washington talks unambiguously about the intention to use an American antimissile system to neutralize a counterstrike by the side which has suffered an attack. On 27 March 1983 C. Weinberger frankly explained in an interview for the NBC television company that an American ABM system "must remove the fear of the threat of a retaliatory (!) strike."

In their examination of scenarios of the outbreak of a nuclear war in a situation in which an antimissile system is present on the U.S. side, the authors of the article in THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE do not express--unlike the Pentagon chief, for example--a firm belief in the possibility of creating absolutely reliable protection of U.S. territory from a retaliatory strike in retribution. In the first stage of the creation of such a system they consider its penetration by 10 percent of launched nuclear warheads to be an "acceptable option."

If the authors are not very concerned about the unreliability of an antimissile system in protecting the United States from a retaliatory strike in retribution, what, in their opinion, can be the real purpose of deploying it? To give the American military-industrial complex a chance to earn billions of dollars on the "Strategic Defense Initiative"? That is very possible. But it is obviously not the only reason.

The authors express apparent anxiety about the "skeptical attitude" of the United States' West European allies toward Reagan's "Strategic Defense Initiative," which is explained by the authors as "confusion in the study of technical matters." Kampelman and his coauthors express the hope--admittedly without much confidence--that in time the U.S. allies' apprehensions about the U.S. space plans will decrease.

The authors continually stress that Washington has now supposedly adopted an essentially new military strategy, which envisages a shift of emphasis from offensive to defensive weapons, the renunciation of the concept of "mutual assured destruction" and the adoption of the concept of "mutual assured survival." For understandable reasons, Kampelman and his coauthors do not consider it necessary to link the present administration's plans to create an antimissile system for the United States with the old American strategy of

"limited" nuclear war in Europe. Meanwhile, as it follows from the completely concrete military measures taken by the Pentagon and from Washington's strategic aims, the "new formula" for a nuclear war at a considerable distance from America's shores is based on the hope of ensuring the aggressor's relative security from a retaliatory strike. The American "star wars" plan arises from the requirements of the concept of "limited" nuclear war.

An antimissile shield for the aggressor means a "limited nuclear war" for Europe. That is the meaning of the evolution of the Pentagon's strategic aims.

Washington continues to strive to make the Europeans pay for the consequences of the destabilization of the military-political situation in the world. What is new here lies in the fact that whereas previously the United States counted, without sufficient justification, on aggression with relative impunity because of the distance of its territory from potential theaters of military operations in Europe, now, according to its designs, the "acceptability" and even "expediency" of plans for nuclear adventures on this continent should be reinforced by a large-scale antimissile system for the entire territory of the United States.

With all their illusory nature, the intentions to create an "impregnable antimissile umbrella" for the aggressor are equally dangerous to Europeans and Americans, for the implementation of these intentions could increase the temptation for one hothead in Washington to "push the button" in a critical situation, with all the resulting catastrophic consequences for our planet.

The result of implementing the American plan to prepare for "star wars," S. Talbott, the well-known TIME magazine commentator, says, "could be the worst of all possible worlds, a world in which an unreliable defense would be combined with the escalation of offensive systems."

Stability in the world cannot be ensured by the buildup of space and nuclear weapons. The implementation of U.S. plans to militarize outer space will simply activate a chain of "action-counteraction" in the arms race and will undermine the basis for agreement in Geneva.

The Soviet side is convinced that there are no international questions which could not be resolved at the negotiating table, and that the guarantee of success in Geneva will be the honest and serious fulfillment of previous agreements, including the premises of the joint Soviet-American statement of 8 January 1985.

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ATLANTA CONFERENCE OF FORMER SECRETARIES OF STATE REPORTED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 85 (signed to press 16 Apr 85) pp 70-71

[Article by A. A. Fursenko (Atlanta-Leningrad): "Conference in Atlanta"]

[Text] The Southern Center of International Research held a conference in Atlanta at the end of last year, soon after the presidential election, to discuss "The Foreign Policy Prospects of the Re-Elected Administration." This conference, organized by center President Peter White, was the second meeting attended by former U.S. secretaries of state. The first such conference was held a year earlier, in December 1983, and was also convened for the discussion of current foreign policy issues.*

The second meeting of secretaries of state in Atlanta was televised by the PBS national network on 8 January 1985. The people present at the meeting were unanimous in their opinion that Soviet-American relations and the settlement of problems in the Middle East and Central America should be the main areas of concentration in U.S. foreign policy.

All of them stressed the need for congressional participation in the establishment of a bipartisan framework for foreign policy, a framework acceptable to Republicans and Democrats.

C. Vance said that he regarded relations with the Soviet Union as "a top priority." Others agreed with this statement. D. Rusk remarked that successful Soviet-American dialogue is important to the future of the world, as any conflict could raise the "serious question as to whether this planet can secure the continuation of the human race." "We and the Soviet Union," Rusk said, "share the colossal common responsibility to prevent nuclear war."

E. Muskie spoke of the significance of U.S.-USSR arms control and arms reduction talks. He expressed doubts, however, about the willingness of the U.S. administration to conclude agreements of this kind and advised that some concessions be made for the sake of compromise.

* See SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1984, No 12, p 120.

This proposal was supported by W. Rogers, who expressed his belief that the USSR wants agreements. In his opinion, the chances for this kind of agreement are "probably somewhat better" now that Reagan "toned down his rhetoric" during the campaign. Rogers remarked that "any talks require a definition of the midway point" to which each side should move, with a view to the legitimate defense interests of the USSR and the United States. In Rogers' words, the time has come for "bipartisan efforts" to convince the Soviet Union that "we are actually guided by objective considerations, have abandoned superfluous rhetoric and want to sit down together and work out an agreement." He proposed that the two previously negotiated treaties on the limitation of underground nuclear tests be ratified, as this "simple act" would serve as "an important signal to the Russians" that the United States is ready to take action.

The importance of an agreement on the demilitarization of space was noted at the conference in Atlanta. In reference to Reagan's "Star Wars" program, D. Rusk issued a warning: "We must realize that the Soviet Union can match all of our achievements in this area. This makes the idea of any kind of unilateral superiority ridiculous." The "Star Wars" program will cost billions of dollars plus additional billions for the development of counter-weapons to be used against space systems. Even after spending these gigantic sums, which Rusk called "mindboggling," the United States will not be able to change the strategic balance of power in the world. "For this reason, any schoolchild who takes a sober look at the situation would ask," Rusk said, "why start it at all if it is unnecessary?" He proposed that maximum efforts be made without delay to prevent an arms race in space.

It must be said that speakers made an effort to underscore their loyalty to President Reagan's policies. They used various excuses to justify U.S. foreign policy actions, including the invasion of Grenada, but they also expressed the hope that the Washington administration would not resort to armed intervention in the future. The discussion of the state of affairs in NATO reflected the same point of view. "We must admit," D. Rusk said, "that American strength has definite limits and not expect Washington to somehow control all world events."

In general, the discussion in Atlanta demonstrated a desire to find a way out of the current impasse in which U.S. foreign policy is now trapped.

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COMPREHENSIVE STUDY BY SOVIET EXPERTS ON AMERICAN AFFAIRS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 85 (signed to press 16 Apr 85) pp 110-113

[Review by N. I. Lebedev of book "Sovremennaya vneshnyaya politika SShA" [Contemporary U.S. Foreign Policy] in two volumes, editor-in-chief G. A. Trofimenko, Moscow, Nauka, 1984, vol 1--464 pages, vol 2--479 pages]

[Text] American foreign policy seems to have come full circle in the postwar decades. After starting out with the widely publicized plans for the "pax Americana" and starting a "cold war" and arms race for this purpose, the American ruling class had to acknowledge the futility of confrontation policy and power politics at the beginning of the 1970's and entered the "age of negotiation" with the USSR. Now, on the other hand, theories and actions described by American official propaganda as something allegedly designed to "restore balance" are almost exact repetitions of the U.S. foreign policy guidelines of the early 1950's, presupposing a "position of strength."

Obviously, American imperialism is incapable of restaging postwar history. The world has changed. A powerful and dynamic socialist community is active and is growing stronger, and dozens of young states are putting up an increasingly intense fight for genuine independence. The United States has also changed. It no longer occupies the absolutely dominant position in Western economics and finance which it seized at the end of World War II. Decades of interventionist policy leading to two major wars and dozens of military actions on a smaller scale and wasteful expenditures (of more than 2 trillion dollars) on military needs have not strengthened the United States' international position. Furthermore, all of this has weakened the domestic political support for interventionist policy and the consensus of the ruling class on matters of foreign policy.

What are the real causes of the United States' current aggressive policy line in world affairs? How can the dangerous implications of this policy for the future of today's world be measured and the methods and means of its effective counteraction be determined? There is no need to prove the importance of valid scientific answers to these questions in the middle of the 1980's.

This is why the thorough two-volume study "Sovremennaya vneshnyaya politika SShA," prepared by the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of

Sciences, is so pertinent from the standpoint of science and of politics. This monograph is not merely a compilation of numerous facts about American foreign policy after World War II (which would be of considerable value in itself). This is primarily an analytical interpretation of the entire process by which U.S. foreign policy is made and implemented.

It must be said that many studies of American foreign policy have been published inside and outside the United States. However, in spite of interesting generalizations and sometimes unexpected vantage points for the examination of foreign policy issues, works by bourgeois authors--from leftist liberal studies by, for instance, G. and J. Kolko to the establishment "bibles" by H. Morgenthau, H. Kissinger and S. Hoffman--could not present a truly objective and complete picture of the engineering and pursuit of U.S. policy in the world arena. Only Marxist-Leninist methodology, which is successfully used in the book being reviewed for the analysis of this truly global--both in terms of geographic dimensions and in terms of spheres of implementation--policy, can reveal the actual motives of American imperialism's international behavior and present a strict scientific analysis of its doctrinal foundation, means of influence and specific guidelines. The recent published work by A. N. Yakovlev, prominent Soviet expert on international affairs, "Ot Trumena do Reygana (doktriny i real'nosti yadernogo veka)" [From Truman to Reagan (Doctrines and Realities of the Nuclear Age)],* also provides conclusive evidence of this.

The authors first analyze the increasingly acute conflict "between the imperious great-power ambitions rooted in the idea of the American global mission and the United States' constantly diminishing real chance of conducting an imperialist policy in the world arena" (vol 1, p 4). And this is no coincidence. After all, this is essentially the central issue in the struggle that has been going on in the United States for four decades now, a struggle which dies down periodically only to flare up again stronger than ever. This is a struggle between competing segments of the ruling class, the main segments of the state-monopolist bourgeoisie.

All successive foreign policy doctrines, in spite of their real and imaginary differences, reflected the continuous search by the U.S. ruling class for ways of fighting against revolutionary and national liberation movements and ways of establishing political and economic control over regions and entire continents--in short, the search for effective instruments for the realization of so-called "American vital interests." Revealing the class essence of this political propaganda phrase, the authors correctly point out the fact that these interests of American state-monopolist capitalism consist in the eventual creation of a system of international relations (or "world order") which will secure the preservation of the prevailing system of social relations in the United States and allow for the expansion of American capital's international influence and attacks on the world socialist system. The attainment of these main objectives, in the opinion of U.S. ruling circles, will be possible only if they can "secure the position of 'world leader' and consolidate their hold on it" (vol 1, p 180).

* For a review of this book, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1985, No 4--Editor's note.

In addition to this, in an analysis of the nature and structure of the driving forces of postwar U.S. foreign policy, the authors reveal all of the complexity of its elements, giving the reader a rare opportunity to "look behind the scenes" of the American foreign policy establishment.

It is a fact that factors other than the selfish class aims of the monopolist bourgeoisie's upper echelon influence the international policymaking process. There is no question that they include the heterogeneity of the U.S. ruling class, which unavoidably leads to confrontations between various segments over specific issues and areas of foreign policy activity. These confrontations take place in government institutions and, on a broader scale, in the sociopolitical life of the American society as a whole, in which "secondary," as the authors define them, factors of influence--parties, labor unions and lobbies--interact. It is also wrong to ignore the fundamental impossibility of confining U.S. foreign policy motives exclusively to the aims of the American establishment. "The dialectical combination of continuity and change in the evolution of U.S. foreign policy in the postwar years," the authors correctly point out, "took shape within the context of the common interests of dominant classes and reflected the adaptation of these interests to the current balance of power within the United States, the balance of power in the world arena and the situation within the dominant class" (vol 1, p 23).

The fluctuations and reversals characteristic of U.S. foreign policy in the postwar period would be inexplicable without some consideration for the dialectically contradictory interaction of the entire group of motives and interests of the American ruling class, examined within a specific historical context.

The authors' analysis of numerous historical facts provides the basis for a precise and concise description of the basic features of American foreign policy and its main parameters. Above all, these are the invariable inclination to use military force in the resolution of international problems, the high degree of militarization and the adherence to hegemonist, imperious ideology.

In addition, as the authors of the two-volume work correctly point out, there is the dominant feature of this policy, uniting all others and giving it a precise class purpose. This is anticommunism--the persistent efforts of the U.S. ruling class to use every opportunity to "contain" and "roll back" world socialism and its chief stronghold, the USSR. It is therefore no coincidence that U.S. policy in relations with the Soviet Union is analyzed at length in this work.

It was precisely the constantly increasing strength and influence of the USSR and the fraternal socialist countries that caused the rift between the strategic objectives of American foreign policy and the resources needed for their attainment throughout the postwar period. "For the American side, detente was essentially," the authors logically say, "an attempt by the U.S. ruling class to bring American goals in the world arena and the means of their attainment in line with the new balance of power in the world and the diminishing potential of the United States" (vol 1, p 205).

At the same time, Washington's return to tough confrontation with the socialist world in the late 1970's and early 1980's and the revival of imperious ambitions accompanied by the institution of sweeping military programs designed to implement the idea of superiority testified that the balance of power in the upper echelon had undergone definite changes. The upper hand was gained by groups believing that the "rift" should be corrected not by setting more realistic goals but by flexing America's military muscles. This kind of policy destabilizes the international situation, increases tension and heightens the risk of nuclear war.

The futility of this policy line is becoming increasingly evident even for those in the United States who enthusiastically supported the idea of "restoring" American strength just recently. "Paradoxically, the administration's strategy of restoring lost influence is obviously accelerating the decline of American military and economic strength. Internal and international limitations have kept the administration from acting on its wishes to restore American power," stated experts from the Council on Foreign Relations, the American Enterprise Institute, Princeton University and several other influential academic centers in a recently published American work.

The USSR's persistent and consistent struggle to straighten out Soviet-American relations, the realization by some members of U.S. ruling circles of the catastrophic implications of nuclear war and the futility of attempts to achieve military superiority to the USSR, the growth of the peace movement in Western Europe and America, the overt and covert resistance of Washington policy by some of its allies and the growing internal difficulties of American capitalism are all imposing tangible limits on the policy of aggressive anticommunism and anti-Sovietism with which American rightwing forces have armed themselves.

Although this Soviet study of the vast group of theoretical and historical aspects of U.S. policy in relations with the USSR in the 1970's and 1980's warrants a high rating, we must also say that a detailed examination of the American leadership's ambiguous approach to detente, the sociopolitical basis giving rise to more realistic tendencies in U.S. foreign policy, and the analysis of the causes of Washington's subsequent attempts to return to a policy of confrontation with the USSR are still important tasks to be performed in future comprehensive studies of U.S. foreign policy.

In their discussion of the relationship between the global and regional levels of American imperialism's international activity, the authors make the valid statement that "whereas global strategy determines the most general and long-range foreign policy objectives, stemming primarily from the general interests of monopolist capital, regional tactics are concerned with the attainment of these objectives through direct action in specific countries and regions" (vol 2, p 151).

The work contains substantial evidence that virtually all regional guidelines of American foreign policy stem from global objectives, especially the struggle against the Soviet Union and other socialist states and against liberation and revolutionary movements and the desire to rule the world.

The diminished American opportunities to influence the international situation are reflected not only in Washington's confrontations with socialism and the national liberation movement, but also in relations with partners. We must agree with the authors that "in spite of all the leverage the American leadership can use to exert pressure on its allies, it is no longer capable of completely imposing its own solutions to various problems on them or of forcing them to do something they do not want to do" (vol 1, p 251).

Attempts to bridge the gap between goals and the possibility of their attainment have given rise to Washington's efforts to take more effective foreign policy action. A long section of the second volume is rightfully devoted to this matter. "American hegemonism and the continuation of American diktat in its previous forms have become less possible," the authors say, "and this is the reason for the concern of U.S. foreign policy theorists and policymakers with the search for new means and methods of securing a position of 'superior strength' for their country" (vol 2, p 49). This is the reason for the increasingly extensive use of economic, scientific, technical, diplomatic, ideological and sociopolitical means of influencing the surrounding world in American foreign policy practices.

But whereas the U.S. leadership is capable, even if at a great cost to American society, of accumulating colossal military potential and has an impressive arsenal of foreign economic, scientific and technical means of pressure, the search for means of ideological influence is quite a different matter. The technical perfection of the propaganda machine and the resourcefulness of bourgeois ideologists cannot compensate for the ideological crisis that has stricken capitalism, including the American variety. Furthermore, Washington's attempts to use its accumulated military strength, even if only in local operations, and its desire to exert forcible pressure on other states will discredit U.S. foreign policy ideologically, undermine U.S. influence in the world and eventually lead to the further erosion of this state's international position.

The main conclusion of the authors of this work seems extremely pertinent today: Given the present balance of power between socialism and capitalism, the role of the United States in the system of international relations will depend on "the degree to which it can adapt to the changing world and find its own place in it without jeopardizing its own existence and the existence of the world community in general" (vol 1, p 16).

The publication of the two volumes of "Sovremennaya vneshnyaya politika SShA" is a definite milestone in the development of Soviet studies of American affairs and an important event in scientific life.

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BOOK ON U.S. INTERPRETATION OF STRATEGIC PARITY REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 85 (signed to press 16 Apr 85) pp 121-122

[Review by A. V. Kozyrev of book "Voyenno-strategicheskiy paritet i politika SSHA" [Military-Strategic Parity and U.S. Policy] by Aleksey Arbatov, Moscow, Politizdat, 1984, 317 pages]

[Text] The issue of military-strategic parity between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO is thoroughly analyzed in this book. It reveals the views of, on the one hand, the particular segments of the American ruling class that are inclined to acknowledge military-strategic parity with the USSR and, on the other, those who still support Washington's adventurist plans to attain military superiority for the purpose of dictating its own terms to the Soviet Union and the rest of the world.

The author traces the evolution of U.S. foreign policy and military strategy since the middle of the 1970's. He describes how the militarist and aggressive groups that view parity as the main obstacle in the pursuit of hegemonist policy have gradually gained the upper hand in the United States. They have tried to tip the balance by planning and implementing programs for the buildup of the American nuclear strategic offensive arsenal and have openly acknowledged the ability to deliver a "counterforce" or "disarming" but certainly first and triumphant strike. Military-strategic aims of this kind are recorded in various types of reckless doctrines about "limited" or "global" wars and "brief" or "protracted" nuclear wars. The author's objective analysis of the driving forces of this militarist line and its multiple negative impact on the international situation proves that this line is precisely the reason for the current disruption of strategic stability with its potentially catastrophic implications.

The study is distinguished by accurate opinions and sweeping political conclusions combined with a thorough expert analysis of the military-technical and economic features of the Pentagon's strategic weapon systems and specific programs. This makes the author's conclusions even more convincing and allows him to logically expose the real essence of the attempts by rightwing American political scientists and official propaganda to justify the development of various types of new weapons with apologetic statements, particularly references to their allegedly stabilizing nature. The author's criticism of

the American attempts to substitute the so-called theory of strategic stability for the principle of equality and equivalent security agreed upon by the USSR and United States is of particular importance. He reveals the complete futility of these attempts and the unscrupulous motives of the supporters of this theory.

Washington tried to impose it on the USSR during the talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms and on nuclear arms in Europe (cut off in 1983 when the United States began deploying new American missiles in Western Europe). The Soviet Union's approach at these talks--and this is illustrated well by the author--had the aim of mutually acceptable decisions on the maintenance of the military balance at ever lower levels as the fundamental means of keeping the peace and consolidating it.

Conclusive arguments in the book prove that the arms race escalated by the Pentagon has inflicted tremendous damage on international stability, and that the intense buildup of first-strike nuclear missiles and the search for ways of disrupting the military-strategic balance in a number of military-technical spheres, particularly those connected with the militarization of space, are doing even more to exacerbate the situation in the world. The development of antisatellite systems, including those designed to put space-based advance warning, surveillance and communications vehicles out of commission, and the new plans for the development of a large-scale ABM system to reduce retaliatory strength, the author stresses, could have, and are already having, the most destabilizing effect on parity (p 272).

The defenders of the theories of strategic stability and arms control must know this, but they prefer to ignore it. "The reasons for this," the author says, "are obvious: Washington is counting on superiority in these spheres--it has no need for 'stability' when the Pentagon sees a chance to achieve military superiority" (p 273).

The author's thorough study of various aspects of the military-strategic balance is especially pertinent at this time of new Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons. The only realistic way of maintaining and reinforcing strategic stability will entail the discussion of the entire group of questions pertaining to space and nuclear arms--both strategic and medium-range weapons.

As the author points out, "the disappearance of American nuclear superiority and the appearance of military-strategic parity in the late 1960's and early 1970's and its reinforcement over the next decade were the historic achievements of the Soviet people" (p 3). By creating the opportunity to restrain the most extreme forms of aggression by imperialist circles, parity serves as the basis of the policy of preventing nuclear war.

Obviously, not all of the aspects of U.S. policy in this sphere can be analyzed in a single study (in particular, the discussion of the United States' relations with its allies with regard to this matter seems inadequate). There is no question, however, that this study represents a significant contribution to the theory of military-political relations in today's world and to the understanding of the realities of the nuclear age.

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BOOK ON IMPERIALIST PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 85 (signed to press 16 Apr 85) pp 122-123

[Review by L. B. Berzin of book "Psikhologicheskaya voyna v strategii imperializma" [Psychological Warfare in Imperialist Strategy] by V. L. Artemov, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1983, 140 pages]

[Text] The chief aim of the author of this book was to prove that the ultimate goal of the psychological warfare launched by U.S. imperialism to solve primarily political problems stems from the desire of U.S. ruling circles to shake the moral, psychological and political stability of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community (p 50).

The author uses extensive documented information to provide a precise description of how the class solidarity of the international bourgeoisie is reflected in anti-Soviet and anticommunist propaganda. In a description of the strategy and tactics of psychological warfare, he reveals its most important and distinctive features and forms. His categorization of contemporary imperialist propaganda and its political-class principles is of the greatest interest in this connection (p 102).

He describes the programs the Reagan Administration is employing to unite all anticommunist forces and channel their efforts toward a common goal. This applies above all to the project known as "Truth" with its inherent idea of a "crusade" against socialism, an idea later amplified in the so-called program of "Democracy and Public Diplomacy."

There is no question that the author is correct in his assumption that the ideological subversive activity of U.S. ruling circles also performs another function: They are striving to refute the idea that the line of international detente, which has been consistently and resolutely pursued by the USSR, is the only possible way of preventing a nuclear catastrophe.

All of the contents of this book reaffirm the fact that the anticommunist banner now unites an entire team of slanderers and overt misanthropes who want to destabilize the world situation for the sake of their own selfish class goals.

The author correctly notes that the latter-day crusaders of the 1980's are obviously incapable of creating a united front against the socialist world. Imperialism's current psychological and ideological warfare is just as futile as all previous campaigns to undermine the political vigilance of the Soviet people and the people of the socialist community countries.

V. L. Artemov's informative study is a valuable and useful work and will serve as a scientific aid for a broad range of specialists and propagandists concerned with contemporary bourgeois ideology.

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BOOK ON UNORTHODOX ECONOMIC THEORIES REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 85 (signed to press 16 Apr 85) pp 123-124

[Review by T. S. Muranivskiy of book "Antiotodoksal'nyye ekonomicheskiye teorii (kriticheskiy analiz)" [Unorthodox Economic Theories (Critical Analysis)] by V. D. Sikora, Kiev, Vishcha shkola, 1983, 155 pages]

[Text] An analysis of the relationship between American economic theories and the theories of the capitalist countries of Western Europe can be of great interest in the investigation of the development of bourgeois economic thought. This monograph by V. D. Sikora warrants consideration in this context.

The author begins his research with the mid-1960's, the time of the failure of the pretentious attempts of American economists to create a wholly formalized economic science and raise it to the level of the precise natural sciences. On the basis of the "neoclassical synthesis," American economists had been able to exert considerable influence on "Anglo-Saxon economic thinking" in the 1950's and 1960's and even to strengthen their position in Italy, France, the FRG and other West European countries. The hopes for the international unification of bourgeois economists around the American variety of "neoclassical synthesis" were, however, unjustified.

From the end of the 1960's to the present time, American political economy has been the scene of endless battles between competing currents: These are conservatism, the social-institutional current, "post-Keynesian eclecticism" (a variety of "neoclassical synthesis" of the 1970's and 1980's) and leftist radical political economy.

The leading current of American bourgeois political economy is made up of social-institutional theories, which include institutionalism (the "mainstream") of J. Galbraith, G. Myrdal, R. Lekachman and others, the works of members of the Association of Evolutionary Economic Theory (United States), "post-Keynesianism," the theories of the "post-industrial society" of the 1970's and the "paradigms" proposed by A. Lowe, N. Georgescu-Roegen, B. Ward, K. Boulding and others in the 1970's and 1980's.

This current, as the author demonstrates, reflects the desire of some members of the bourgeoisie to strengthen their influence by means of maneuvers and

partial concessions and reforms. In contrast to the supporters of the "neoclassical synthesis," the advocates of social-institutional theories proceed from a belief in the decisive significance of politics, approve of substantial market limitations, express negative feelings about the subjective theory of maximum value and so forth. This current, however, is incapable of taking a dominant position in American bourgeois political economy, the disintegration of which into competing schools and currents attests to the growing severity of its crisis.

The author also describes the tendency toward the formation of combinations of various currents on an eclectic basis. In a textbook (1980) P. Samuelson tried to associate orthodox Keynesianism with conservatism. The same position has been taken by J. Tobin, W. Baumol, A. Blinder and others (p 116). American bourgeois economists from various currents have analyzed a broad range of issues of practical and analytical interest. They have engaged in increasingly broad market analyses and studies of the interaction of politics and economics, supply and demand and micro- and macro-economic issues, the role of formalized and verbal methods in economic science, etc.

The author's analysis of the interaction of economic policy and theory in the United States is interesting. He shows that conservative theories have dominated the engineering of Ronald Reagan's economic programs (p 133). Keynesian and social-institutional elements have also been employed. This has resulted in an eclectic economic policy with a conservative basis. Its failure is injuring the reputation of conservative theories and of other currents of American political economy.

V. D. Sikora's book elucidates various aspects of the interaction of American political economy with economic theories in a number of West European countries. It is indicative that American social-institutional theorists (R. Lekachman, R. Heilbroner, J. Galbraith and others) view the bourgeois-reformist or social-democratic orientation of some West European countries as confirmation of the accuracy of their opinions (pp 72-73). English and Swedish economists (J. Robinson and G. Myrdal) believe, for their part, that social-institutional theories with their program of broad-scale reformism can help in surmounting the difficulties of the American economy (p 60).

In general, the influence of American economic theories declined in the late 1970's and early 1980's in Western Europe, as the author demonstrates in this book. For this reason, conflicts and disagreements have grown more acute among American political economists and political economists of other countries.

The author has cogently demonstrated that the hopes of social-institutional economists for the alleviation of economic difficulties with the aid of their doctrines have not been corroborated by the experience of Western Europe. The use of some premises and recommendations of social-institutional theorists in Sweden, France, the Netherlands, Austria and other countries did not save these countries from crisis-related recession, mass unemployment, devastating inflation, income disparities and the poverty of a large segment of the population (pp 73-75).

This work by V. D. Sikora is the first attempt in Soviet literature at an overall study of changes in bourgeois political economy in the 1970's and 1980's on the basis of an analysis of American economic theories in their interaction with West European theories. The work has made the findings of new research by bourgeois economists available to the academic community and it points up new symptoms of the crisis of bourgeois political economy.

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BOOK ON CHANGING U.S. INTERPRETATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5, May 85 (signed to press 16 Apr 85) pp 124-125

[Review by N. A. Dolgoplova of book "Na sluzhbe antirazryadki. Doktrina 'natsional'noy bezopasnosti' vo vneshney politike SShA v 70-80-kh godakh" [At the Service of Anti-Detente. The Doctrine of "National Security" in U.S. Foreign Policy in the 1970's and 1980's] by N. N. Novoselova, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1984, 148 pages]

[Text] This book contains an analysis of the class nature of the American doctrine of "national security," its distinctive features and its role and influence in the policy of American imperialism. The author examines this doctrine in the broad context of general trends in the development of U.S. foreign policy. In addition, N. N. Novoselova describes the features the doctrine has acquired in the past decade. This is quite understandable since the doctrine of "national security" has been exploited quite extensively and actively on the level of ideological propaganda ever since U.S. ruling circles made their move from international detente to anti-detente.

In his examination of the origins and class content of the doctrine, the author severely criticizes the attempt of bourgeois researchers to portray it as a "national"--in other words, supra-class--doctrine (which is, incidentally, also characteristic of their interpretations of terms such as the "national interest" or "national priorities"). The author stresses that the doctrine of "national security" is designed primarily to camouflage the class nature of the foreign policy pursued by the U.S. ruling elite mainly in the interests of the grand monopolistic bourgeoisie. This is the reason for the deliberately vague definitions of this term by bourgeois specialists, the absence of precise scientific premises and the "veil of vague phrases," as N. N. Novoselova writes, covering the specific meaning of the term. "The more vague the definition of U.S. 'national security' is, the easier it is to adapt the doctrine to temporary fluctuations and reversals in American imperialism's international policy" (p 16).

In addition to this, N. N. Novoselova's book describes how the concept of "national security" has been given different interpretations by different segments of the monopolist bourgeoisie during different historical periods, attesting to definite conflicts between them. As for the actual policy

designed to guarantee "national security," the author writes, it has never been made under the influence of any one, absolutely dominant point of view, and this also reflects diverging interests within the monopolistic bourgeoisie (p 9).

The author describes how militarist and pro-militarist groups gained the upper hand during the fierce domestic political struggle of the 1970's and early 1980's: The military-industrial complex acquired more influence on every level, and this had a direct effect on the priorities, forms and methods of "national security" doctrine. N. N. Novoselova directs special attention to the fact that the deliberately stimulated alarm with regard to "national security" issues at that time had a completely tangible basis, rooted in domestic politics. By transferring the emphasis to external dangers, the threat allegedly posed by the Soviet Union, U.S. ruling circles were trying to create the kind of moral and psychological atmosphere that would make it possible to surmount antiwar feelings and the so-called "Vietnam syndrome" and to pump appropriations from the social sphere into the military one. By making provocative statements about the "Soviet threat" to U.S. "national security," they were trying to discredit the peace movement and portray its members as "Moscow's agents" (p 37). In connection with this, the author arrives at an accurate conclusion about the multiple purpose of "national security" doctrine: American imperialism's aggressive aims in the international arena are indissolubly connected with the reactionary thrust of domestic policy (p 52).

N. N. Novoselova points out the obvious anti-Sovietism of "national security" doctrine, which took extremely flagrant forms during the period in question. This aspect of the policy of U.S. ruling circles is examined in the book in all of its dynamics. There is a clear description of how the concept of the Carter Administration gradually acquired more pronounced anti-Soviet features--the features characteristic of Reagan Administration policy.

American ruling circles are also trying to base their policy in relations with their allies on force and anti-Sovietism. This is demonstrated in the chapter in which the author examines the foreign policy priorities of "national security" doctrine. The author writes that the administration has always waved the banner of "genuine partnership" in its attempts to involve its West European allies in a senseless and destructive arms race they cannot afford (p 93).

In this book, N. N. Novoselova thoroughly examines the means by which "national security" goals are attained--the economic, scientific and technical leverage, ideological propaganda and, most importantly, the threat to use force. In the second half of the 1970's and the early 1980's, special emphasis was placed on these threats. This was reflected in higher military spending, the U.S. attempt to disrupt the strategic nuclear balance and its efforts to achieve military superiority.

Pointing out the dramatic growth of aggressiveness and adventurism in U.S. efforts to implement the "national security" doctrine, the author stresses that Washington is using the latest achievements of the military-technical

revolution for this purpose and is posing a lethal threat to the people of the world.

In general, the doctrine of "national security" with its aggressive aims, as N. N. Novoselova conclusively demonstrates in her book, represents a serious threat to the security of all countries, including the United States' own security.

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VERNON WALTERS--PERMANENT U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

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[Article by V. V. Chernyshev]

[Text] On 1 March 1985, 68-year-old retired Lieutenant General Vernon Anthony Walters, former deputy director of the CIA and ambassador at large, became the permanent U.S. representative to the United Nations. As the WASHINGTON POST remarked, "for the first time in his 44 years of government service, he will emerge from the secret world of intelligence and confidential diplomatic missions into the light of public diplomacy."

Walters' appointment, according to American observers and UN circles, could indicate some change in the style, but certainly not the essence, of American diplomacy in the United Nations. The common view is that he is just as inveterate an anticommunist and just as frank a supporter of policy from a position of strength and of U.S. world domination as his predecessor Jeane Kirkpatrick (she, incidentally, supported his nomination).

"I," Walters said when he learned of his appointment, "will make every effort to continue Kirkpatrick's excellent work in the United Nations to restore and strengthen U.S. influence."

"This devout Catholic and ardent anticommunist," the NEW YORK TIMES said about Walters, "is one of the 'jingoists' who called the war in Vietnam one of the most noble and selfless" in American history. He has said that his world is circumscribed by the belief that the United States is "mankind's last and best hope." According to the WASHINGTON POST, his "tough anti-communist views and many contacts with foreign military leaders, especially in Latin America and Africa, have put him among the favorites of conservative Republican administrations," although Democratic administrations also made extensive use of the services of the general in charge of special missions. Walters was sent on such missions of the most varied types in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, Africa, South America and Central America by five U.S. administrations.

He was born on 3 January 1917. His father owned an insurance company and was English by birth. Vernon Walters managed to complete part of his secondary

education in Jesuit-run English and French Catholic schools before financial difficulties sent him to work in the family firm. After volunteering for armed service in 1941, he advanced rapidly, and even though he had no high school diploma he became, according to NEWSWEEK magazine, "a skillful adjutant who used his extraordinary linguistic talent to acquire a general's stars, serving along the way as an interpreter for five presidents."

Walters is fluent in a group of foreign languages: French, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, German, Dutch and Russian. This brought him to the attention of General M. Clark, commander of the American Fifth Army in Italy, during World War II. Clark used Walters for communications with the Brazilian units in this army. By the time of the liberation of Rome, he was already Clark's adjutant. When newspapers print Walters' service record, they point up the fact that he worked in Paris as A. Harriman's assistant in carrying out the Marshall Plan, accompanied President D. Eisenhower and Vice-President R. Nixon on foreign trips as their interpreter and worked as a U.S. military attache in Brazil and France.

Between 1972 and 1976 (under Presidents Nixon and Ford), Walters was deputy director of the CIA and then, after "waiting out" the years of President Carter's administration in retirement, became an ambassador at large under President Reagan, carrying out special missions in almost 100 states during Reagan's first term in office. As the NEW YORK TIMES remarked, "he preferred to enter a country unannounced, in advance, before the start of diplomatic discussions" supposedly for the purpose of polishing up his linguistic skills and "rode the buses to refresh his memory of the local dialect."

Even reports in the American press, however, testify that the "delicate assignments" Walters worked on during his overseas missions had little to do with language. According to the WASHINGTON POST, for example, when the Brazilian military establishment overthrew the civilian government in 1964, leftist forces in this country accused Walters, then the U.S. military attache in Rio de Janeiro, of "instigating a conspiracy." According to American public organizations, particularly the Council on Western Hemisphere Affairs, he formed the closest relationships with the Pinochet clique in Chile, the former military junta in Argentina and other military and extreme rightwing regimes.

It is not surprising that the appointment of Walters, in view of his service record, was applauded by members of rightwing political groups in the United States, who were afraid that Kirkpatrick's resignation meant the loss of their "permanent representative" in the United Nations and the Reagan Administration. Now they are only afraid that Walters might not be able to act as "independently" as she did in dealing with Secretary of State G. Shultz and other members of the foreign policy establishment. They have said, in particular, that Shultz was the chief supporter of Walters' appointment, as Walters has been officially under Shultz' jurisdiction in recent years and has proved to be, in the words of the WASHINGTON POST, "a loyal supporter of the secretary of state's policies."

According to reports in the American press, V. Walters wanted permanent access to meetings of the National Security Council (his predecessor in this

office, J. Kirkpatrick, had this right). His request, however, was denied. He will be invited only to NSC meetings where matters related to his work in the United Nations will be discussed.

When Walters' critics list his shortcomings, the NEW YORK TIMES remarked, they also mention the fact that "although he was effective in carrying out assignments, he was never asked to participate in policymaking or to state his views on major political issues." Judging by all indications, what the Reagan Administration expects most from Walters is the constant promotion of Reagan's policy line in the United Nations, a process begun by Kirkpatrick--the line of strengthening U.S. positions by means of pressure, especially on the developing countries--and the use of the UN rostrum to attack socialist countries and governments disliked by Washington and to justify U.S. militarist preparations.

White House spokesmen have stressed, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT remarked in this connection, that the change of ambassadors will not change the administration's inflexible approach to the United Nations.

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